MUHAMMAD SARWAR (deceased) through Legal Heirs MANZOORAN BIBI and others vs MUHAMMAD AKBAR and others
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the possession of a property originally classified as evacuee property. The core legal question concerned the applicability of Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, to a property where the respondent had acquired ownership through a registered sale deed executed after the repeal of the relevant settlement laws. The Supreme Court observed that the respondent became the owner of the property in 1976, subsequent to the repeal of the Settlement Laws in 1975, rendering the applicability of the repealed Act's provisions questionable. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner had previously conceded the non-applicability of Section 30 during the first appellate proceedings and had sought time to vacate the premises, which was granted. The Court held that the petitioner, having failed to vacate the premises despite his own undertaking and having engaged in protracted litigation for over two decades, had no merit in his claim. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.
- Does Section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act 1958 apply to property ownership acquired after the repeal of the Settlement Laws?
- Can a party who has conceded the non-applicability of a statutory provision during appellate proceedings later challenge that position in a higher court?
- Is a party bound by an undertaking given to a court to vacate premises within a specific timeframe?
- Section 30, Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act 1958
' SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN, J.---Leave to appeal is sought against the judgment, dated 14-5- 2001 passed by an Hon'ble Judge of Lahore High Court in R.S.A. No, 47 of 1980.
2. House No, 815-A situated in Ahmadpur East Lama Town, Tehsil Sadiqabad being an evacuee property was transferred by the Settlement Department. The transferee entered into an agreement to sell with Nathe Khan (predecessor-in-interest of the respondents). Some differences cropped up and ultimately Nathe Khan was declared owner through a decree of specific performance of contract, which was subsequently executed in Court through a registered sale deed, dated 8-7- 1976. At that time, and may be since prior thereto, Muhammad Sarwar was the occupant of the house. Nathe Khan brought a suit for possession which was dismissed by the trial Court on the ground that no notice was issued to the occupant under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1958.
3. The First Appellate Court and thereafter the High Court in Regular Second Appeal through its judgment, dated 14-5-2001 held the view that the provisions of section 30 of the Act were not applicable and hence Muhammad Sarwar was liable to be dispossessed and further that it was not a case of jurisdiction of a Rent Controller. Muhammad Sarwar through this petition seeks leave to appeal.
4. After listening to the learned counsel at length, we are of the view that Nathe Khan had become owner of the suit property through a registered deed, dated 8-7-1976 during execution proceedings and had become owner at a time when the Settlement Laws had already been repealed in the year, 1975. So the question of applicability of section 30 of the repealed Act carries a big question mark.
5. Apart therefrom, the most glaring aspect of the case is that during first appeal the learned counsel for the present petitioner had conceded to the non-applicability of section 30 and Muhammad Sarwar himself had requested for time to vacate the premises. Upon his request for the grant of a period of 6 to 8 months, the Court had granted him 6 months to vacate the house as per judgment, dated 21-1-1980. It is sad to note that despite the grant of a period of 6 months on his own request, he failed to vacate the premises for the last 22 years thereafter and has dishonestly been dragging Nathe Khan and his legal heirs in the litigation.
6. There being no merit in the petition, it is hereby dismissed and leave to appeal is refused.