PROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB through Secretary, Government of the Punjab

' FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J.--- These appeals under Article 185 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, by leave of the Court, involving common question of law and fact, are directed against judgments, dated 29-3-2000 and 13-10-2000 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in' Writ Petitions Nos.11273, 12257, 12596 of 1999, 8885, 6164, 5056, 8416, 6874, 8319, 8917 and 16537 of 2000.

2. The petitioner No,1 (Government of the Punjab) issued a Notification, dated 28-9-1998, purportedly under the provisions of subsection (1) of section 3 of the Punjab Immovable Property Tax Act, No,V of 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1958), whereby urban areas, excluding agricultural land, located outside the Municipal limits of the Municipal Corporation but within the boundaries of controlled areas of the Faisalabad, Multan, Gujranwala and Rawalpindi Development Authorities were declared as Pocket Rating Areas for the purpose of levy of urban immovable property tax. A similar. Notification dated 1-12-1998 was issued by the petitioner No,1 thereby declaring certain areas, excluding agricultural land and areas of Cantonment Board, located outside the limits of the Lahore Metropolitan Corporation but falling within the boundaries of controlled areas of Lahore Development Authority as Pocket Rating Areas for the purpose of levy of property tax. The respondents filed the aforesaid writ petitions calling in question the validity of Notification, dated 28-9-1998 and 1-12-1998 in respect of their properties located within the Pocket Rating Areas of Faisalabad Municipal Corporation or, as the case may be, the Lahore Metropolitan Corporation. The same were allowed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, by the impugned judgments dated 29-3-2000 and 13-10-2000. Hence these appeals, by leave of the Court.

3. The learned Assistant Advocate-General, Punjab, argued that atax on an immovable property within an urban area was leviable under the provisions of section 3 of the- Act of 1958. An urban area had been defined by section 2(i) of the Act of 1958 to be "an area within the boundaries of a Municipal Corporation, Municipal Committee, Cantonment Board, Small Town Committee, or other authority legally entitled to or entrusted by Government with the control of management of a Municipal or a local fund". The learned Law Officer contended that an "Urban Area" for the purposes of the Act of 1958 was not necessarily to fall within the Municipal limits of a Municipal Corporation or Metropolitan Corporation. Therefore, the areas falling within the territorial and operational jurisdiction of other authorities such as Faisalabad Development Authority or the Lahore Development Authority were rightly declared by Notifications dated 28-9-1998 and 1-12-1998 to be the Pocket Rating Areas for the purposes of assessment and levy of property tax under the Act of 1958. The High Court had taken an erroneous view that the property tax was not leviable under the Act of 1958 in respect of areas outside the territorial limits of the Faisalabad Municipal. Corporation or the Lahore Metropolitan Corporation. A reference was made to the provisions of sections 18, 25 and 26 of the Lahore Development Authority Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1975) and the provisions of section 137 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. The learned Law Officer submitted that the position in the case of the Faisalabad Development Authority was in no way different from that of the Lahore Development Authority.

4. On the other hand, both the learned counsel appearing for the respondents in Civil Appeals Nos.1789, 1790 and 1792 of 2001 argued that by virtue of section 27 of the Act of 1975, the Lahore Development Authority administered a fund which was known as "Lahore Development Authority Fund". It was neither a Municipal nor a local fund. The position of the Faisalabad Development Authority was also similar. Therefore, the areas in dispute could not be treated as, urban areas for the purpose of levy of tax under the provisions of section 3 read with section 2(i) of the Act of 1958.

5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. Admittedly the areas for which the property tax was sought to be levied by Notification dated 28-9-1.998 and 1-12-1998 were located outside the territorial limits of the Faisalabad Municipal Corporation or the Lahore Metropolitan Corporation being rural areas of Faisalabad and Lahore Districts. Under the provisions of section 3(1) of the Act, '1958, the Government may specify by notification rating area within the limits of an existing urban area for which the property tax shall be levied. However, the Act of 1958 does not empower the Government to declareany area other than an urban area to be a rating area within the meaning of section 2(g) (ibid). The word "Urban Area" is defined in section 2(i) of the Act of 1958, to be an area within the boundaries of a Municipal Corporation, Municipal Committee, Cantonment Board, Small Town Committee or other authorities legally entitled to or entrusted by the Government with the control or management of a Municipal or localfund. The learned Law Officer of the Punjab failed to demonstrate that the properties in dispute were not located within the territorial limits of Faisalabad Development Authority established by the Government under the provisions of section 4 of Punjab Development of Cities Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1976) or the Lahore Development Authority constituted by the Legislature by section 4 of Act, 1975. Therefore, for the purpose of decision of these appeals, it would hardly make any difference whether or not the said Authorities were administering local or Municipal fund and were otherwise covered by section 2(i) of the Act of 1958 by reference to the rule of ejusdem generic as explained by this Court in the case of Mian Ahmed Saeed and others v. Election Tribunal for Kasur and 7 others 2003 SCM R 1611. The word "Area" has been defined in section 3(b) of the Act of 1975 as the Lahore Metropolitan area. Similarly section 18 of Act, 1975 empowers Lahore Development Authority to declare any locality within the "Area" to be a controlled area for the purposes of the said Act and may issue in respect of such localities such directions as it considers fit and proper and do all such things as may be necessary for the prevention B of haphazard growth, encroachment and unauthorized constructions in such area. The position of Faisalabad Development Authority was stated to be the same. It would be thus, clear that the controlled area was necessarily to fall within the limits of Lahore or as the case may be, Faisalabad Development Authority. Needless to point out that the operation of the provisions of Act of 1958 for the purpose of assessment and levy of property tax is limited only to the urban areas.

6. The provisions of the Act of 1958, being a taxing statute, arerequired to be construed strictly.

There is no intendment or presumption about a tax. We have to go by the language clearly employed by the Legislature in the fiscal statute. In the case of Messrs Star Textile Ltd. And 5 others v. Government of Sindh through Secretary, Excise and Taxation Department Sindh Secretariat, Karachi and 3 others 2002 SCM R 356 this Court while examining the provisions of sections 5 and 8- A of the Act of 1958, as applicable to the Province of Sindh, expressed the view that where language of a fiscal law was unequivocal and unambiguous, then it had to be looked at what was clearly stated therein and there was no scope of implication, intendment and equity. In Collector of Customs (Preventive) v. Muhammad Mahfooz PLD 1991 SC 630, it was held that while construing fiscal statute, one must read wordsand interpret them in the light of what was clearly expressed and should not rely upon meanings which were not expressed but were implied. In Tennant v. Smith (1892) A.C. 150 (at 154) Lord Halsbury stated as follows:-- "In a taxing Act, it is impossible, I believe, to assume any intention, any governing purpose in the Act except to take such tax as the statute imposes ....Cases, therefore, under the taxation Act always resolved themselves into the question whether or not the words of the Act has reached the alleged subject of taxation."

' In Dewer v. I.R.C. (1935) 2 K.B. 351 (360), it was said that either in the clear words of a taxing statute, the subject was liable or if he was not within the words, he was not liable. In Attorney-General v.

Milne (1914) A.C. 765 (781) it was held that the Finance Act was a taxing statute and if the Crown claimed a duty thereunder it must show that such a duty was imposed by clear and unambiguous words.

7. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgments of the High Court do not call for any interference by this Court. We do not find any merit in these appeals which are dismissed accordingly with no order as to costs.