SAID ALI vs SAFDAR ALI and others
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against a High Court order declining the restoration of a civil revision petition that had been dismissed for non-prosecution. The civil revision was directed against concurrent findings of fact regarding a declaration suit concerning a Tamleek-nama of ancestral property. The petitioner filed an application for restoration under section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908, nearly six months after the dismissal, attributing the default to the counsel's clerk. The High Court dismissed the application, noting that the case was printed in the daily cause list and the explanation was unsatisfactory. The Supreme Court held that the High Court rightly exercised its discretion in refusing restoration, as the delay was not sufficiently explained and valuable rights had accrued to the respondents. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner lacked a strong case on merits concerning the ancestral property. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed.
- Whether the High Court's discretionary refusal to restore a civil revision dismissed for non-prosecution warrants interference by the Supreme Court?
- Does a mistake by a counsel's clerk in noting the date of hearing constitute a sufficient ground for condoning a prolonged delay in filing a restoration application?
- Whether an application for the restoration of a civil revision dismissed for non-prosecution is governed by Article 120 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act 1908 allowing a period of three years?
- Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Article 120, Limitation Act 1908
' RANA BHAGWANDAS, J.---Petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the High Court order dated 9-4- 1999 whereby his application for restoration of Civil Revision No,1120 of 1994, dismissed on 12-10-1998 for non-prosecution, was declined.
2. Petitioner filed civil revision against concurrent findings of factagainst him in a suit for declaration in respect of a TamleekNama in his favour by his father, which was admitted to regular hearing. As none appeared before the High Court on the date of hearing, it was dismissed vide order dated 12-10-1998. Petitioner, for the first time on 5-4-1999, moved an application under section 151, C.P.C. For restoration of the revision application on the averments that the clerk of the counsel had missed to note the date of hearing in the diary of the counsel. Since the restoration application itself was moved nearly after six months, and the case was duly printed in daily cause list with all particulars, this ground did not weigh with the learned Judge in the High Court, who, in exercise of his discretion, disallowed the prayer giving rise to thfs petition.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the caveator and gone through the record and the impugned order. No doubt, an application for condonation of delay was moved before the High Court but the ground urged in support thereof did not find favour with the learned Judge in the High Court for valid reasons.
4. Learned counsel reiterated the same arguments, which were advanced before the High Court.
High Court having exercised its discretionary jurisdiction, generally speaking, this Court does not interfere with the exercise of such jurisdiction unless it has been exercised arbitrarily or in contravention of the settled principles of law, justice and equity. Ground urged in the belated application for restoration of the revision petition, in our view, was neither sufficient nor plausible to deprive the respondents of valuable right& accrued to them by passage of time.
5. Learned counsel referred to Muhammad Sadiq v. Mst. Bashiran PLD 2000 SC 820 in support of the view that since no period was prescribed for restoration of a civil revision, in terms of Article 120 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, petitioner could move the application within three years. We are not inclined to agree with the submission of the learned counsel, which is not in consonance with theletter and spirit of the law. Precedent case can be justifiablydistinguished on facts.
6. Even otherwise on merits, prima facie, the petitioner does not seem to have a strong case as the dispute relates to ancestral property of which gift is claimed in favour of the petitioner depriving his brothers and sisters of their due share in the inheritance. Both the Courts below having found against the petitioner, we think substantial justice has been done to the parties. In our view, no ground has been made out for interference with the exercise of jurisdiction and no substantial questionof law of general public importance has been raised in this petition, D which is accordingly dismissed.
Cited by 5 cases
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- MUHAMMAD SHARIF vs MUHAMMAD RAMZAN and 3 others 2005 YLR 1778
- CHAIRMAN EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY BOARD, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, LAHORE and another vs PRESIDENT OF QUETTA HINDU PUNCHAYAT and another 2010 PLJ Quetta 10
- (1) Ghulam Qadir, etc. (in C.A. 510/2012) (2) Ayas Khan. (in C.A. 934/2012) 2016 SCP 30