MESSRS SHAHI BOTTLERS LTD., LAHORE vs KHUSHI MUHAMMAD Arm 5 OTHERS

This is an employer's petition under Article 199 of the Constitution challenging an adjudication by the Labour Appellate Tribunal condoning the delay, and remanding the proceedings to the Labour Court for decision on merits vide its order dated 24-7-1976.

2. The employees who have been impleaded as respondents were retrenched from service on 12- 12-1973. They individually filed applications under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance on 13-3-1975 and also submitted along therewith an application under section 5 of the Limita--tion Act for condonation of the delay. The Labour Court took note of the explanation furnished for claiming condonation of the delay and rejected the same holding that the petitions were filed after gross delay, and dismissed the petitions as time barred. The Appellate Tribunal after examining the cause of the delay held: "In view of the above, I condone the delay in filing the petitions under section 25-A, accept the appeal, set aside the decision of the learned Labour Court and remand the case back for decision on merits."

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the condonation of the delay on the following grounds:----

(1) That appeal did not at all lie in the case and the decision given is without jurisdiction. Reliance is placed on the case of Syed Mukhtar Hussain and 2 others v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and another PLD 1979 Lah. 748 and Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Lahore v. Chairman Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and another PLD 1979 Lah. 415.

(2) That the reason advanced for getting the delay condoned was not such as could hold good in the present case.

(3) That there was an estoppel on the representation of the Collective Bargaining Agent in the earlier proceedings in view of which there was no ground for extending the period of limitation.

4. It was not disputed that the respondent-employees also qualify as workmen under the Industrial Relations Ordinance. Their rights in the matter of retrenchment are secured under the Standing Orders Ordinance. On the basis of the reasoning adopted in the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the employees had remedies under two laws The first under the Industrial Relations Ordinance and the second under the Standing Orders Ordinance. Where such is the case, the benefit of both has to be extended to them or in any case the more beneficial one has to be made available to them as held in General Steel Tools Company, Gujranwala v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.2, Lahore and 2 others (PLD 1976 Lah. 528). The very language of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance indicates that whosoever qualifies as a workman under that law can seek the remedy provided therein in respect of the rights secured under other laws. This provision therefore establishes a link directly with the substantive rights enshrined in some other Act for which a remedial enforcement provision is made under this law. Apart from this line of reasoning the incorporation of section 25-A, on the strength of Standing Order 12, clause (3) has a distinct feature. The clause reads; "The services of a workman shall not be terminated, nor shall a workman be removed, retrenched, discharged or dismissed from service, except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken. In case a workman is aggrieved by the termination of his services or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal, he may take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance."

5. The expression "and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance" have to be noted. If it were the intention of the Legislature to stop at incorporating section 25-A and to restrict the incorporation to it, such an expression would not have followed. The only meaning that can be given is that once resort to 25-A is taken on the strength of this provision the provisions of that section in the matter of redress of individual grievance shall apply. Whatever therefore is the procedure embedded or attached or linked with section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance in the matter of the redress of grievance, will automatically be. Available. 'The provision being remedial in nature, the full benefit of the remedy has to be given to the party claiming it. The restriction of the remedy only to the stage of Labour Court and not extending it beyond to appeal and other proceedings available would appear to be some what arbitrary and out of context. The judgments referred to particularly Pakistan International Airlines Corporation is under examina--tion by the Supreme Court (PLJ 1979 SC 116).

6. It has been the established law that if an authority has jurisdiction to entertain a matter it has also the jurisdiction to decide the question of limitation rightly or wrongly. On that principle the appellate Court could condone the delay whether the sufficiency of the grounds is made out in the eyes of any other authority or person or not. In the case of Lyalipur-Sahiwal Bus Service (Regd.), Lahore v. Appellate Authority and 2 others (PLD 1970 Lah. 775), it was held that: "There is, therefore, no lack of authority against the proposition advocated by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned Member, Board of Revenue, who had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from an order of the Regional Transport Authority did not only entertain but proceeded to dispose it of after repelling the objection on the score of limitation. His order, howsoever wrong might it be cannot be said to be without lawful authority so as to attract the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 98 of the Constitution."

In the case of Saeeduddin Ahmad Naqvi and others v. Abdul Ghafoor and others (1977 SCMR 306), it was held that if the Rehabilitation Commissioner had jurisdiction to entertain revision petition he could decide whether or not to condone the delay in its presentation and the High Court could not interfere with the Rehabilitation Commissioner s order in the writ jurisdiction. In Mumtaz Khan v.

Chef Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and another (PLD1966SC276), identical was the law laid down.

7. There is no question of estoppel in the case for the status of the Collective Bargaining Agent to commit or represent on behalf of these employees was a fact in issue.

7. In the circumstances, the petition has no merit and is dismissed. No order is made as to costs in the circumstances of the case.