FATEH KHAN and others vs SULTAN KHAN
This petition for leave to appeal challenged a High Court judgment that set aside lower court decrees and restored a pre-emption suit, directing it to be decided afresh. The core legal question was whether the period between 1st August 1986 and 28th March 1990, during which no pre-emption enactment was in force, created a legal vacuum that rendered pre-emption suits filed during that time liable to dismissal on the grounds of limitation. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners' contention that this period was not covered by law. The Court held that Section 36(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance 1990 explicitly addressed this period, declaring that judgments or orders dismissing pre-emption suits instituted or pending during that timeframe were of no legal effect. The Court affirmed that the Ordinance provided a mechanism for such suits to be decided afresh upon application within sixty days of the Ordinance's commencement. Consequently, the Court found no infirmity in the High Court's decision to restore the suit, as it was legally protected by the statutory provisions of the 1990 Ordinance.
- Does the period between 1st August 1986 and 28th March 1990 constitute a legal vacuum for pre-emption suits?
- What is the effect of Section 36(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance 1990 on pre-emption suits pending during the period from 1st August 1986 to 28th March 1990?
- Can a pre-emption suit be dismissed on the grounds of limitation if it falls under the protection of Section 36(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance 1990?
- Section 36(2), Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance 1990
ORDER: JAVED IQBAL, J.--- This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment, dated 28-10- 2002 whereby revision petition preferred on behalf of the respondent has been accepted and judgments/decrees of both the Courts below were set aside and the suit preferred on behalf of respondent was directed to be treated as pending in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Pindi Ghep, District Attock.
2. Heard Mr. Muhammad Akram Chaudhry, learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of the petitioners at length. We are not persuaded to agree with the prime contention of the learned counsel that there was a complete vacuum w,e,f, 1-8-1986 to 28-3-1990 as during that period no pre-emption enactment was in existence and therefore, the period of limitation will be four months and on this score alone, the suit for pre-emption should have been dismissed for the simple reason that section 36(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance (XVIII) of 1990 made it abundant clear that "all the decrees, judgments or orders dismissing the suits of pre-emption, instituted or pending during the period from 1st August, 1986 to 28th March, 1990, in which the right of pre-emption was claimed as is available under this Ordinance, shall be of no legal effect, and such suits, on an application made by the aggrieved person, within sixty days of the commencement of this Ordinance, shall subject to subsection (2), be decided afresh according to the provisions thereof."
The period termed as "vacuum" has been saved and covered by the provisions as enumerated in section 36(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Ordinance (XVIII) of 1990. Admittedly the suit was restored under section 36(2) of the Pre-emption Ordinance (XVIII) of 1990 wherein the limitation period has been prescribed as 60 days and therefore, it could A not have been dismissed on the point of limitation.
3. No infirmity, perversity or illegality could be pointed out by the learned counsel warranting interference in the judgment impugned which is well-reasoned. The petition being/meritless is dismissed and leave refused.