MUHAMMAD IJAZ vs THE S. H. O., POLICE STATION, RAJANA, FAISALABAD

ORDER

KARAM ELAHI CHUHAN.--Muhammad Ijaz, petitioner, filed a writ petitionbeing Writ Petition No. 3072 of 1979, , under Article 199 of the Constitution read with section 154, Cr. P. C. Praying that the respondent, S. H. O., Police Station Rajana, District Faisalabad, maybe directed to register a case under sections 364, 342 and 323, P. P. C. The petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court by a short order dated 9-6-1979, which reads as follows :--- "The entire evidence in this case is available to the petitioner. No further investigation is to be made. The petitioner should, therefore, save time and approach the trial Court straightaway. Any order asking for registration of a case and investigation would rather result in waste of time. This petition is, therefore, dismissed in limine."

2. The petitioner has come up in a petition for special leave to appeal against the same to this Court.

3. The petitioner argued his case in person and submitted that actually his grievance was that Maqsood Ipbal who was allegedly abducted and being kept in wrongful confinement somewhere should be directed to be recovered and produced in Court. We have gone through the petition which was filed by the petitioner in the High Court and it may be mentioned that it contains no such prayer and nor was that a petition of the nature of habeas corpus. If the petitioner is really serious 'he is at liberty to resort to an appropriate remedy in a Court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the law on the subject aforesaid. So far as the prayed for the registration of a case on concerned, we find nothing wrong in principle in the order passed by the learned Single Judge in this be half l The petitioner argued that under section 154, Cr. P. C., it is always mandatory on a Station House Officer to record an F. I. R., whenever a report regarding the commission of a cognizable offence is made to him. It was further submitted that similarly when a petition for enforcing such a duty of the Station House Officer is made in the High Court, it was incumbent on the High Court also to always issue a writ of mandamus on this simple grievance regardless of any other facts or circumstances whatever. The contentions have no merit and were repelled by this Court in Jamshed Ahmad v. Muhammad Akram Khan and another (1) (Hamoodur Rahman, C. J., Muhammad Afzal Cheema and Abdul Kadir Sheikh, JJ). It is instructive to reproduce paragraphs 2 to 4 of that judgment which read a follows; "2. In support of the petition for leave, learned counsel contended that respondent No. 1 was under an obligation to register the case at the instance of the petitioner reflecting his own version of the incident notwithstanding the fact that in respect of the same transac--tions a case had already been registered. In support of this, learned counsel has relied on the plain language of the statutory provision contained in section 154, Cr. P. C.

3. We are not impressed by the argument. A perusal of the record shows that on receipt of the petition, the learned Judge had called for a report from respondent No. 1 who gave three reasons for the non-registration of the case at the instance of the petitioner Firstly, that no case could be registered against the Tehsildar/Sub Registrar, whom the petitioner wanted to rope in as one of the accused persons, without the previous approval of the Provincial Anti-Corruption Council, Divisional Anti-Corruption Committee. Secondly, that according to his information the report sought to recorded was false, and thirdly, that a case o; forgery and cheating etc. Was already under investigation in respect of the same transaction, the petitioner having been named as one of the accused therein.

4. The petition could be thrown out on the short ground that the High Court was under no obligation to grant the Belief prayed for by the petitioner. Ii was a matter resting entirely in its discretion and there is nothing to indicate that it was improperly exercised. Even otherwise, by no means does the impugned order shut the door on the petitioner who is at liberty to initiate criminal proceedings by lodging a complaint. The position is too well known to reiterated that the Supreme Court does not sit as a Court of appeal and interfers only in cases of grave injustice, the present case being certainly not one of those. The petition is, therefore, dismissed."

4. The upshot of the above discussion is that we do not find the present case as fit for grant of special leave to appeal. The petition is dismissed.