Munir Hussain Shah vs Secretary, Provincial Assembly, Punjab, Lahore and another
This petition for leave to appeal challenges a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal regarding his termination from employment. The petitioner, a civil servant, faced departmental proceedings involving three separate inquiries. While the first two inquiries exonerated him, a third inquiry resulted in findings of guilt regarding specific charges, leading to his dismissal. The petitioner contended that the Service Tribunal acted inconsistently by failing to remand his case for a de novo inquiry, as it had done in other similar cases. The core legal question was whether the principle of consistency required the Tribunal to remand the petitioner's case despite factual differences in the charges. The Supreme Court held that the principle of consistency is only applicable when facts and circumstances are identical. Finding that the charges in the petitioner's case differed from those in the cited precedents, the Court upheld the dismissal. The Court further affirmed that it would not interfere under Article 212(3) of the Constitution absent a question of law of public importance.
- Can the principle of consistency be invoked to demand a remand for de novo inquiry when the facts and charges differ from previous cases?
- Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to interfere with a Service Tribunal's findings of fact under Article 212(3) of the Constitution in the absence of a question of law of public importance?
- Section 5, Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1974
- Article 212(3), Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973
IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.--This petition calls in question the validity of the order dated 2.9.2002, whereby service appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed.
2. The relevant facts for disposal of this petition are that Munir Hussain Shah the petitioner was proceeded against departmentally. Statedly the Inquiry Committee exonerated him from the charges levelled against him at the first instance. However, the second inquiry was conducted but without any improvement as the finding of the first Inquiry Officer were maintained. Later on third inquiry was initiated on the basis of allegations which were nine in number recommended against the petitioner as according to him some of the charges against the petitioner stood proved. The Authority accepted the recommendations and terminated the services of the petitioner. Appeal filed by the petitioner before the Punjab Service Tribunal has been dismissed vide judgment, impugned herein.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in two identical cases the Service Tribunal had remanded the cases to the Department for de novo inquiry but in the instant case instant of doing so it has dismissed. The appeal of the petitioner. In our view each case has its own facts and circumstances and has to be decided on its merits either by the Service Tribunal or by this Court.
As far as the principle of inconsistency is concerned it can only be invoked if there are identical facts and circumstances as well but in the instant case the position is different as the learned counsel frankly conceded that in the third inquiry the charges mentioned at S. Nos. 6 and 7 were different from the charges which were levelled against the other employees whose cases have been remanded for de novo inquiry as such, the principle of consistency is not attracted in the instant case. It is contended by the learned counsel that the allegations against the petitioner have not been proved. This .Argument of the learned counsel is also without substance as the Inquiry Officer has opined/recommended against the petitioner and the recommendations made by him have been accepted by the Authority. The Service Tribunal in exercise of its powers under Section 5 .Of Punjab Service. Tribunals Act, 1974 has declined to interfere with the same, therefore, we in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 cannot entertain such argument. Besides it, as no question of law of public importance has been raised warranting interference by this Court, therefore no interference is called for in the impugned judgment.
Thus for the foregoing reasons we see no substance in this petition which is dismissed and leave refused. .