S.M. AFZAL-UR-REHMAN vs FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal directed against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which dismissed the petitioner's service appeal against his removal from the service of the National Highway Authority. The core legal question concerns whether the Tribunal exercised its discretion lawfully in refusing to condone a delay of 185 days in filing a departmental appeal and whether a service appeal remains competent when the departmental appeal is time-barred. The Supreme Court held that a negligent and indolent litigant is not entitled to the indulgence of the court for the enlargement of time, and once a departmental appeal is rejected as barred by time, a subsequent service appeal is incompetent unless the Tribunal condones the delay for sufficient reasons. The court affirmed that the Tribunal acted lawfully and reasonably in declining to condone the delay without entering into the merits, laying down the principle that discretionary refusal to condone substantial delay for a lack of diligence warrants no interference.
- Whether a service appeal is competent when the departmental appeal has been rejected as barred by time?
- Is a litigant who is negligent in prosecuting a remedy entitled to the condonation of a substantial delay?
- Whether the Federal Service Tribunal's discretionary refusal to condone delay warrants interference when exercised reasonably?
' RANA BHAGWANDAS, J.--- Petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) dated 7-6-2002 dismissing his service appeal against removal from service of National Highway Authority, as his departmental appeal against the penalty was rejected as barred by 185 days.
2. Precisely stated, after service of a show-cause notice on the petitioner, obtaining his reply and enquiring into the charge of un-authorized absence from duty for a long period of time, competent authority ordered removal of the petitioner from service vide letter dated 23-5-2001. For the first time, petitioner represented against this action through departmental appeal dated 24-12-2001, which was rejected by the appellate authority i,e, the Secretary, Ministry of Communications and Railways, as time-barred vide letter, dated 16-2-2002.
3. Sole ground urged by the petitioner in support of his prayer for condonation of delay before the Tribunal was that he being out of station, letter of removal from service was received by his brother, with whom he was not on good terms, and actually he came to know about the removal order after seven months. The Tribunal did not feel persuaded by this submission of the petitioner and observed that the petitioner had not acted diligently in pursuing his remedy by not making departmental appeal within the period prescribed by law and was, thus, rightly non-suited by the departmental authority. The Tribunal accordingly declined to condone the delay and without entering into merits of the appeal dismissed the same hence this petition.
4. We have heard Mr. Akhlaq Ahmed Siddiqui, learned Advocateon-Record for the petitioner. He has reiterated the same argument, which was advanced before the Tribunal and rightly rejected for valid reasons.
5. If a person has been negligent and indolent in prosecuting his remedy before the proper forum, he is not entitled to indulgence of the Court, muchless enlargement of time by 185 days, more particularly, when his departmental representation was not entertained by the Department itself. In our considered opinion, by not exercising discretion in favor of the petitioner, the Tribunal neither acted illegally nor unreasonably. There is no strong ground for interfering with the exercise of discretion by the Tribunal, which on the face of it, was neither unfair nor illegal or unreasonable. It is well-settled that once a departmental appeal has been rejected as barred by time, service appeal would be incompetent, unless, for sufficient reasons, the Tribunal deems it fit to condone the delay.
The Tribunal has obviously decided otherwise to which hardly any exception can be taken.
6. In our view, no question of law of public importance is spelt out from the circumstances with the consequence that this petition is devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed.
Cited by 2 cases
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