THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FOOD, LAHORE REGION, LAHORE, ETC. THE DEPUTY
This matter comprises three petitions for special leave to appeal filed against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, dated 8-10-1976, which had set aside the compulsory retirement of the respondents. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether departmental delay caused by examining a matter at various governmental levels constitutes a sufficient ground for the condonation of delay in filing petitions. The Court held that the petitions were barred by time by 45 days and that departmental delays do not furnish a valid ground for extending the period of limitation, reiterating that the government must be treated on par with ordinary litigants regarding limitation laws. Consequently, the applications for condonation of delay were rejected and the petitions were dismissed as time-barred. The key principle laid down is that governmental departments cannot claim preferential treatment under the law of limitation, and each day of delay must be properly explained regardless of administrative processes.
- Does departmental examination of a matter at various government levels constitute a sufficient ground for condonation of delay?
- Can the government claim a different standard than an ordinary litigant under the law of limitation?
- Must each day of delay be properly and sufficiently explained when seeking an extension of time?
- Order XLIX Rules 3 and 6, Supreme Court Rules 1956
ORDER
KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN, J.-This judgment and order will dispose of three Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal bearing Nos. 62, 63 and 64 of 1977.
2. In view of the order which we propose to pass it is not necessary to go into the lengthy details of these cases and it will be sufficient to mention that these petitions have been filed against an order of the Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore, dated 8-10-1976 whereby the service appeal filed by each of the respondents in his respective case against an order directing his compulsory retirement was accepted and the impugned retirement order was held as not maintainable and was quashed. All these three petitions are barred by 45 days as reported by the office. That the petitions wet barred by time has not been disputed before us and the petitioners hay in each petition filed an application under Order XLIX, rules 3 and 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1956, for the condonation of delay on the sole ground that the matter remained under examination of government at various level and hence it got delayed in that process. The plea raised legally speaking does not constitute a "sufficient ground" for condonation of delay. The period of limitation was fully known to the petitioners, and they would have been well advised to finalise the matter in respect of taking a decision to file or not to file an appeal, well in time. It is well settled that while asking for condonation of delay each day of limitation has to be properly and sufficiently explained. The applications filed for condonation of delay do not fulfil these requirements, apart from the fact that as already observed even on principle the mere fact that the matter got delayed because of its having remained under examination at different departmental levels is not a valid ground for extension of period of limitation. In Province of East Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid Darji and others (1970 SCMR 558) it was laid down that "this Court has also in several cases had occasion to point out that so far as limitation is concerned the Government cannot claim to be treated in any manner differently from an ordinary litigant, because of the fact that the Government enjoys unusual facilities for the preparation and conduct of their cases and its resources are much larger. If in spite of these facilities the Government cannot comply with the requirements of the law of limitation, then it is for it to take steps to have that law changed and not to ask the Courts to give a different interpretation to its provisions." The result is that the applications for condonation of delay and extension of time in each case are rejected and the petitions for special leave to appeal are dismissed as time barred.
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