Pakistan Case Law
2006 CLD 528

GHULAM MUSTAFA BUGHIO and anothers vs JUDGE BANKING COURT

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Citation2006 CLD 528
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.C.P.No,587 of 2003,
Date2005-04-08
Judge(s)Sabihuddin Ahmed, C.J. and Maqbool Baqar
ResultPetition dismissed
AI Summary — generated from this judgment; read the full text below and verify before relying on it.

This constitutional petition was filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 by the petitioners challenging a judgment and decree passed by a Banking Court in favour of respondent No. 2. The core legal questions addressed by the Sindh High Court were whether a trade name constitutes a legal person capable of maintaining legal proceedings, and whether constitutional jurisdiction can be invoked against a judgment of the Banking Court when an alternate and efficacious statutory remedy of appeal exists under Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, particularly when the period of limitation for filing such an appeal has expired. The High Court held that a trade name is not a legal person, that the availability of an alternate remedy under the statute bars the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction, and that constitutional petitions cannot be utilized to circumvent the law of limitation. The petition was accordingly dismissed in limine.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Can a trade name that is not a legal person initiate and maintain legal proceedings?
  • Whether constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution can be invoked when an alternate and efficacious remedy of appeal is available?
  • Can the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court be allowed to circumvent the law of limitation for filing an appeal?
Laws & provisions referred
  • Section 22, Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001
  • Article 199, Constitution of Pakistan 1973
constitutional petitionBanking Courtalternate remedylimitationfinancial institutions recoverytrade name

ORDER

1. ' Petitioner No,1 who is carrying on business under the name and style of Mining and Industrial Consultants (proprietorship firm), has filed this petition, calling in question a judgment and decree of the learned respondent No,1 in favour of the respondent No,2. In the first place petitioner No,2 is not a legal person and merely a trade name under which the petitioner No,1 carries on business and therefore, only proceedings initiated by the petitioner No,1 could be entertained. Again a judgment, decree and trial order of the Banking Court is appealable before this Court under section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and therefore, the petitioner could not invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution in the presence of an alternate and efficacious remedy. Syed Saleemuddin Nasir has relied upon a case of Messrs Unicom Enterprises v. Banking Court No,5, City Court Building, Karachi and 2 others 2004 CLD 1452, which also support this view. Indeed we could possibly treat this petition as an appeal under the aforesaid Ordinance, provided it was filed within the period of. Limitation prescribed by law.

2. Nevertheless, we have noticed that though the judgment of the respondent No,1 was pronounced on 1-3-2003. The petitioner applied for a copy as late as 26-3-2003 and the appeal, therefore, ought to have been filed on or before 6-4-2003. Indeed it is well-settled that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be allowed to be invoked to circumvent the law of limitation and if the petitioner fails to avail the alternate and efficacious remedy available under the law through his own negligence he cannot seek relief under Article 199 of the Constitution. Moreover, no explanation for the delay has been offered. In the circumstances we have no option but to dismiss this petition in limine along with the listed applications.

Cited by 7 cases

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