Industrial Development Bank Of Pakistan And Others vs Mian Asim Fareed
This matter concerns an appeal against a High Court order that quashed an F.I.R. registered for offences under sections 420, 406, and 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The High Court had quashed the F.I.R. on the premise that section 7(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 mandated that only a Banking Court could take cognizance of offences under the Ordinance, and only upon a written complaint by an authorized person, thereby precluding the registration of an F.I.R. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, holding that the registration of an F.I.R. and the judicial taking of cognizance are distinct and independent concepts in criminal law. The Court established the principle that a statutory provision prescribing a specific forum or mode for taking cognizance of an offence does not inherently imply a prohibition on the registration of an F.I.R. unless the legislature explicitly states such a restriction. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, allowing the appeal.
- Does a statutory requirement that only a Banking Court can take cognizance of an offence under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 prohibit the registration of an F.I.R. for the same offence?
- Are the registration of an F.I.R. and the taking of judicial cognizance distinct and independent concepts under criminal law?
- Can a court imply a prohibition on the registration of an F.I.R. based solely on a statutory prescription regarding the mode of taking cognizance?
- Section 420, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 406, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 379, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 7(4), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001
ORDER
KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMADY, J-The F.I.R In question had been recorded for the alleged commission of offences punishable under sections 420, 406 and 379, P.P.C, at the instance of an officer of the Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan but had been quashed by the learned High Court only on the ground that section 7(4) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLV1 of 2001) prescribed that it was only a Banking-Court which could take cognizance of the offence under the Ordinance and that also on a complaint in writing made by a person authorized by the Bank in that behalf and that in the circumstances, recording of an F.I.R in the matter could not be Sustained.
2. Ln the absence of any finding that the above-mentioned offences mentioned in the F.I.R, were false and malicious and in the absence of a finding that if a particular forum or mode had been prescribed with respect to the taking of cognizance of an offence then the same also implied prohibition regarding the registration of an F.I.R, no such order could be passed nor the same could be approved. Needless to add that the registration of an F.I.R, and taking of cognizance of cases were two distinct and independent concepts under the criminal law, that if the intention of the law- maker was to put any clog on the registration an F.I.R then the Legislature would have said so specifically and that if the law a condition only on the taking of cognizance then it can never be read to imply prohibition on registration of FIRs.
3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at sorrie length, we find that the impugned order had not been legally and validly passed, ln the circumstances, this petition is converted into an appeal which is allowed as a result whereof the said order dated 23-12-2004 passed by the learned High Court in Writ Petition No.1181 of 2004 is set aside.