Messrs ASHRAF SUGAR MILLS LTD. through General Manager vs MANZOOR

' FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J.--- The respondent was employed as a worker by the petitioner- Company. His services were terminated on 12-10-2001. Therefore, he filed a grievance petition under the provisions of section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (since repealed) which was accepted by the Punjab Labour Court No,8, Bahawalpur, vide judgment, dated 18-9-2003 and he was reinstated in service. The petitioner-Company preferred Labour Appeal No,38 of 2005/BWP in the Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, which was dismissed vide impugned judgment, dated 26-4-2006. Hence this petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.

2. The learned counsel submitted that under subsection (4) of section 46 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) a Labour Court, in case of wrongful termination of service of a worker, was empowered to award him only compensation of not more than thirty months' basic pay but not the reinstatement in service. Therefore, the order of reinstatement of the respondent in service passed by the Labour Court, as affirmed by the High Court was illegal and without jurisdiction.

3. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length and have also perused the available record. Section 46 of the Ordinance deals with the redress of individual grievances of workers. Subsection (3) thereof lays down, that a worker may take the matter to the Labour Court where the employer fails to communicate a decision within 15 days of the grievance being brought to his notice or where the worker is dissatisfied with such a decision. Subsection (4) provides that in adjudicating or determining a grievance under subsection (3), the Labour Court shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case. This provision is quite identical to subsection (5) of section 25-A of the repealed Ordinance, 1969. Once an order of termination of service is challenged by a worker before the Labour Court, it may pass an order of reinstatement if the same is just and proper. The meaning of the term "just" and "proper" was elaborated by this Court in the case of Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and others PLD 1987 SC 447. It was observed that words "just" and "proper" would mean "right" or "fair" and "suitable". The word "just" in subsection (4) of section 46 of the Ordinance seems to have been used in the sense of "according to law" whereas the word "proper" would mean "accurate". The Labour Court is competent to pass a proper order in accordance with law after observing the procedure provided by the Statute. The provision takes care of legality; propriety and the correctness of the order. In the case of Babul and Sons v.

Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax Nagpur (1978) 41 STC 89 at page 95, it was held that the term "just" with regard to assessm ent of sales tax, would include and involve all procedural application of law and the term "proper" would include adequate application of substantive provision of a Statute. There is nothing to include that after the promulgation of the Ordinance, a Labour Court has become powerless to pass an order of reinstatement of a worker even where it is considered to be just and proper. It would continue to exercise the power of reinstatement of a worker with or without back-benefits under the Ordinance as before.

4. However, subsection(6) of the Ordinance, further enables a Labour Court to award compensation, "in lieu of reinstatement" of the worker in service where his termination is held to be wrongful. This is an alternate power which can be invoked in a particular case where the reinstatement of a worker is not considered to be proper, The mere fact that a Labour Court is also vested with power to award compensation does not take away its authority of reinstatement of a worker. The only restriction placed on the Labour Court is that it cannot award compensation in addition to the reinstatement of a worker. In the case of Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 6 others PLD 1997 SC 582 at page 683, it was held that the words "in lieu of" would mean "instead of", "in place of", "in substitution of" but they did not mean "in addition to". Part-1 of Fourth Schedule of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan enumerates the subjects falling in the Federal Legislative List. Entries 44, 47, 48 and 49 thereof give exclusive power to the Parliament to legislate in respect of duties on excise including duties on salt, taxes on income other than agriculture income, taxes on corporations, taxes on sales and purchases of goods imported and exported, produced, manufactured or consumed. However, Entry 52 also empowers the Parliament to legislate in respect of such taxes and duties on the production capacity of any plant, machinery, undertaking, establishment or installation in lieu of the taxes and duties specified in the aforesaid entries. Does it means that in the presence of Entry 52, the Entries 44, 47, 48 and 49 are redundant or non-existent?

The answer would obviously be in the emphatic "NO".

5. In taking this view, we are also fortified by the provisions of subsection (7) of section 48 of the Ordinance which expressly postulate that where an appeal is preferred to the High Court against the order of a Labour Court directing the reinstatement of a workman, the High Court shall decide such an appeal as soon as possible but not later than 60 days where the operation of the order of reinstatement of a workman passed by a Labour Court is stayed.The Ordinance is a beneficial legislation enacted with the object of ameliorating the working conditions of the workmen by providing necessary safeguards. The Legislature intended to enlarge the jurisdiction and powers of the Labour Courts in order to strengthen them further. Therefore, its provisions are to be construed liberally so as to advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief. We do not find any force in the arguments of the learned counsel. The impugned judgment of the High Court is plainly correct which does not warrant any interference by this Court.

6. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this petition which is dismissed and leave to appeal is refused.