Mst. ATTA ELAHI through Special Attorney vs ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, MUZAFFARGARH and 4 otherss
Mst. Atta Elahi sought leave to appeal against the Lahore High Court judgment dismissing her writ petition, which arose from the dismissal of her pre-emption suit originally filed in 1987. Her application to revive the suit under section 35(1) and (2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 was rejected by the lower courts and the High Court on the ground that the facility to prove Talb-i-Ishhad without having alleged it in the plaint was unavailable, and because section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 had been declared repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam by the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court in Haji Rana Muhammad Shabbir Ahmed Khan's case (PLD 1994 SC 1). Furthermore, the petition was time-barred by 38 days, as time spent obtaining general civil court records rather than the impugned judgment cannot be excluded. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, refused leave to appeal, and laid down that section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 is repugnant to Islamic injunctions and that limitation extension applies only to obtaining copies of the impugned judgment or order.
- Whether the facility of proving Talb-i-Ishhad under section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 is available if it was not originally alleged in the plaint?
- Whether the provisions of section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 are repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam?
- Does the time spent in obtaining general civil court records qualify for the exclusion of limitation when filing a petition before the Supreme Court?
- Section 35(1), Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991
- Section 35(2), Punjab Pre-emption Act 1991
' SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN, J.--- Mst. Atta Elahi seeks leave to appeal against the judgment dated 23-12-2003 of Lahore High Court, Multan Bench whereby her writ petition has been dismissed.
2. The lady had filed a pre-emption Suit No,530 of 1987 against Karim Bukhsh etc. Which, on 18-12- 1988, was dismissed on the basis of this Court judgment in Kamal Shah's case PLD 1986 SC 360, for not having alleged and performed Talb-i-Muwathebat etc. In a case where no decree was passed before 31-7-1986. Subsequently, on promulgation of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 and under section 35(1) thereof she applied for revival of her suit in order to prove the performance of Talbi- Ishhad under subsection (2) of section 35 of the Act. Such application was dismissed by the trial Court as well as by the First Appellate Court. She filed a writ petition which too was dismissed through the impugned order holding that the facility of proving Talb-i-Ishhad under section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 was not available due to being a question of fact, having not been alleged in the plaint. Section 35(2) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 reads:-- "(2) Notwithstanding anything in sections 13 and 30, in respect of the suits mentioned in subsection (1), the period of limitation shall be one year and it shall be sufficient if the pre-emption establishes that he had made `Talb-e-Ishhad' in presence of two truthful witnesses."
3. Not only that we agree with the observation made by the learned High Court but also are of the view that the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court in Haji Rana Muhammad Shabbir Ahmed Khan's case PLD 1994 SC 1 has declared the provisions of section 35(2) of Punjab Preemption Act, 1991 repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, insofar as it exempts the suit of pre-emption instituted or pending between 1st day of August, 1984 and 28th March, 1990 from the requirements of Talb-i- Muwathibat and because it has extended the period of limitation for such suits to one year.
4. The instant petition is also time-barred by 38 days. The ground for condonation, to the effect that the time was lost in obtaining copies of Civil Court record, is also not tenable. The period which is not computed under the law is the one spent in obtaining the copies of impugned judgment or order and not for any other copies that the petitioners might require.
5. Consequently, there being no force in the hopelessly time-barred petition, it is hereby dismissed and leave to appeal refused.