MUDASSAR AHMED KHAN vs ATTIQUE AHMED and anothers
This criminal appeal challenges the judgment dated 4-7-2003 passed by the Magistrate Ist Class, Sheikhupura, acquitting the respondent of an offence under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 in F.I.R. No. 23 of 2003. The core legal question is whether Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 has retrospective effect and applies to a cheque issued prior to its promulgation. The Lahore High Court held that since the cheque was issued on 8-7-2002 and Section 489-F was added to the statute book later on 25-10-2002 without any retrospective effect, the respondent could not be tried or convicted under the said provision. The court established the principle that criminal statutes creating new offences operate prospectively unless expressly given retrospective effect, and protected the fundamental rights against retrospective punishment under Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
- Whether Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 has retrospective effect?
- Can a person be prosecuted under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for a cheque issued before the provision was added to the statute book?
- Does the retrospective application of a penal provision violate Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Section 489-F, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Article 12, Constitution of Pakistan 1973
' KHAWAJA MUHAMMAD SHARIF, J.---This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 4-7-2003 passed by the learned Magistrate Ist Class, Sheikhupura whereby respondent Attique Ahmad was acquitted from the case registered vide F.I.R. No,23 of 2003 under section 489-F, P.P.C., Police Station City A-Division, Sheikhupura.
2. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that there are three ingredients according to section 489-F, P.P.C., first, issuance of cheque, second, its presentation and, third, dishonour. It is further contended that the respondent issued a cheque to the appellant on 8-7- 2002, the same was presented in the bank on 2-1-2003 and was dishonoured while the provision of section 489-F, P.P.C. Was added in the Pakistan Penal Code through Ordinance dated 25-10-2002.
Having concluded, his submissions, learned counsel submits that the learned trial Court, in the afore-referred circumstances, was not competent to acquit the respondents from the case.
3. On the other hand, while defending the impugned judgment of acquittal, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the cheque in question was issued on 8-7-2002 when the provision of section 489-F, P.P.C. Was not brought on the Statute book and was non-existent. He further submits that the impugned judgment is a well-reasoned judgment and does not call for interference by this Honourable Court; that is also against the fundamental rights guaranteed to the respondent by the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 especially Article 12. In support of the submissions, learned counsel relied on 2004 PCr.LJ 1545, 2004 PCr.LJ 263 and 2004 YLR 2867.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, have gone through the record and have also given anxious consideration to the submissions made at the bar. The most important point in this case is that the cheque in question was issued on 8-7-2002 though it was presented to the bank on 2-1- 2003 but the fact remains that section 489-F, P.P.C. Was brought on the Statute book on 25-10-2002 and was nonexistent on its date of issue and there is no mention in the said section that it would have retrospective effect. Respectfully following the dictum laid down in the A judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, I am of the considered view that the respondent could not have been tried for the offence under section 489-F, P.P.C. Because the cheque was issued on 8-7-2002 when the provision of section 489-F, P.P.C. Was still not on the Statute book.
There is no illegality or material irregularity to warrant interfere with the impugned judgment of acquittal. Resultantly, I find no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed.