MUNIR HUSSAIN SHAH vs SECRETARY, PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY, PUNJAB LAHORE and anothers
This petition arises from an order dismissing the petitioner's service appeal regarding the termination of his employment following departmental inquiries. The core legal question concerns whether successive departmental inquiries are sustainable and whether the principle of consistency applies when facts and charges differ. The Supreme Court held that the service tribunal's dismissal of the appeal was justified where the inquiry officer's recommendations against the petitioner were accepted by the competent authority, and the principle of consistency could not be invoked due to distinguishable facts and charges. The Court established that factual determinations supported by inquiry recommendations and upheld by the service tribunal under section 5 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974, do not warrant interference under Article 212(3) of the Constitution in the absence of a substantial question of law of public importance.
- Whether the principle of consistency can be invoked when the facts and charges in a disciplinary case differ from those in comparative cases?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with factual determinations upheld by the Service Tribunal under Section 5 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974?
- Does a service matter involving departmental inquiry findings raise a question of law of public importance warranting leave to appeal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution?
- Section 5, Punjab Service Tribunals Act 1974
- Article 212(3), Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973
' IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.--- This petition calls in question the validity of the order, dated 2-9-2002, whereby service appeal filed by the petitioner has been dismissed.
2. The relevant facts for disposal of this petition are that Munir Hussain Shah the petitioner was proceeded against departmentally. Statedly the Inquiry Committee exonerated him from the charges levelled against him at the first instance. However, the second inquiries were conducted but without any improvement as the findings of the first Inquiry Officer were maintained. Later on third inquiry was initiated on the basis of allegations which were nine in number recommended against the petitioner as according to him some of the charges against the petitioner stood proved. The Authority accepted the recommendations and terminated the services of the petitioner. Appeal filed by the petitioner before the Punjab Service Tribunal has been dismissed vide judgment, impugned herein.,
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in two identical cases the Service Tribunal had remanded the cases to the Department for de novo inquiry but in the instant case instead of doing so it has dismissed the appeal of the petitioner. In our view each case has its own facts and circumstances and has to be decided on its merits either by the Service Tribunal or by this Court.
As far as the principle of inconsistency is concerned it can only be invoked if there are identical facts and circumstances as well but in the instant case the position is different as the learned counsel frankly conceded that in the third inquiry the charges mentioned at S.Nos.6 and 7 were different from the charges which were levelled against the other employees whose cases have been remanded for de novo inquiry as such, the principle of consistency is not attracted in the instant case. It is contended by the learned counsel that the allegations against the petitioner have not been proved. This argument of the learned counsel is also without substance as the Inquiry Officer has opined/recommended against the petitioner and the recommendations made by him have been accepted by the Authority. The Service Tribunal in exercise of its powers under section 5 of Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 has declined to interfere with the same, therefore, we in, exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 cannot entertain such argument. Besides it, as no question of law of public importance has been raised warranting interference by this Court, therefore, no interference is called for in the impugned judgment.
' Thus, for the foregoing reasons we see no substance in this petition which is dismissed and .