ALMAS AHMAD FIAZ vs SECRETARY GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB HOUSING

ORDER

' CH. IJAZ AHMED, J.--- The detailed facts have already been mentioned in the impugned judgment.

However, necessary facts out of which the present petition arises are that the petitioner was appointed as Sub-Engineer (Overseer) on work charge basis from 3-1-1988 to 31-3-1988.

Subsequently, he was appointed as Sub-Engineer or work charge basis vide order, dated 13-8-1995 in Public Health Department for 3 months, thereafter, he was appointed on ad hoc basis in regular basic scale against permanent post vide order, dated 7-12-1995. He continued to work on the said post as such till 23-7-1998. Respondent No,2 converted appointment of the petitioner into work charge basis vide order, dated 23-7-1998. The petitioner 'filed representation on. 9-9-1998 before respondent No,1 with the prayer for direction to regularize his service. During pendency of his representation, he was again appointed on work charge from 24-1-1999 for six months by respondent No,2 vide order, dated 13-2-1999. Respondent No,1 failed to decide his representation, petitioner being aggrieved filed Appeal No,2264 of 1998 in the Punjab Service Tribunal which was dismissed as not maintainable being premature. Petitioner filed Writ Petition No,7999 of 1999 in the Lahore High Court which was dismissed vide order, dated 14-3-2002 in the absence of his counsel.

Petitioner filed application C.M. No,1 of 2002 in Writ Petition No,7999 of 1999 for rehearing of the writ petition which was dismissed vide order, dated 29-5-2002. He had also filed I.C.A. No,318 of 2002 in the Lahore High Court which was dismissed vide order, dated 30-9-2002, thereafter, petitioner sent grievance notice on 7-11-2002 to the Secretary Government of Punjab. Petitioner filed petition under section 46 of the I.R.O. 2002 before the Punjab Labour Court No,1 on 25-11-2002. The learned Labour Court after completing the legal formalities accepted the petition vide judgment, dated 15-7-2003.

Respondents being aggrieved filed Labour Appeal No,268 of 2003 in the Lahore High Court which was accepted and the case was remanded to the learned Labour Court. The learned Labour Court after remand accepted the petition vide judgment, dated 5-6-2004. Respondents being aggrieved filed Labour Appeal No,258 of 2004 in the Lahore High Court which was accepted vide impugned judgment, dated 13-12-2005 where it was held that the petitioner remained in the service till 23-6- 1999 but he served grievance notice to the respondents after 3 years and 4-1/2 months and thereafter filed grievance petition. Hence, the present petition.

2. The learned counsel of the petitioner submits that respondent had not taken a ground before the Labour Court in their written reply that petition filed by the petitioner was time-barred. He further urges that petitioner had mentioned the circumstances in para.6 of his petition on the basis of which he could not serve notice to the respondents well in time. He further urges that learned Labour Court was justified to accept the petition of the petitioner with cogent reasons keeping in view the provisions of West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and the law laid down by Superior Courts whereas the learned High Court reversed the judgment of the Labour Court in appeal without adverting to the reasoning of Labdur Court and non-suited the petitioner on technical ground that his petition was time-barred and decided the appeal without adverting to the circumstances of this case and specially without perusing para.6 of his petition and this fact brought the case in the area that learned High Court had decided the appeal by misreading and non-reading of the record.

3. We have given our due consideration to the contentions of learned counsel of the petitioner and perused the record. It is deemed proper to reproduce relevant provision of law and facts to resolve the controversy between the parties.

' Relevant Provision of I.R.O., 2002 (section 46(1).

"A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or, settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his shop steward or collective bargaining agent, within one month of the day of which cause of such grievance arises."

(a) Cause of action accrued to the petitioner on 23-6-1999.

(b) Petitioner filed Appeal No,2264 of 1998 before the Service Tribunal which, was dismissed on 22- 3-1999.

(c) Petitioner filed Writ Petition No,7999 of 1999 which was also dismissed on 14-3-2002.

(d) Petitioner filed C.M. No,1 of 2002. The same was dismissed on 29-5-2002.

(e) Petitioner filed I.C.A. No,318 of 2002 which was also dismissed on 25-11-2002.

(f) Petitioner sent grievance notice to the respondents on 7-11-2002.

(g) Petitioner filed grievance petition before the Labour Court on 25-11-2002 which was accepted by the Labour Court vide judgment, dated 5-6-2004.

(h) Respondents filed L.A. No,258 of 2004 which was accepted vide impugned judgment, dated 13- 12-2005.

4. In case the aforesaid facts are put in a juxtaposition, then it is clear that the petitioner had served grievance notice on 7-11-2002 after 3 years and 4-1/2 months and thereafter filed grievance petition on 25-11-2002. In case the cause of action accrued on 30-9-2002 to him after dismissing of his I.C.A. By the learned High Court, even then he had not served grievance notice to the respondents in terms of section 46(1) of I.R.O 2002 within specified period of one month. It is a settled principle of law that the question of limitation under section 46 of the I.R.O. Has to be rigidly construed on the well-known maxim that no party is allowed to circumvent the provisions of the statute of limitation. It is yet another principle of law that the party approaching Court of competent jurisdiction for redress of grievance beyond specified period of limitation is bound to explain each day's delay to the satisfaction of respective forum because a valuable right accrues to the other side. See Government of Punjab v. Muhammad Salim PLD 1995 SC 396=1995. SCMR 546; Rehmat Ullah and others v. Ulyas Khan 1968 SCM R 975 and Pakistan Railway v. Ghulam Sarwar 1989 SCM R 864.

5. It is a settled law that the period for the redressal of grievance under section 46 of I.R.O. 2002 begins once the cause of action had accrued. It had accrued on 23-6-1999 and not on the decision by the learned High Court in his I.C.A. On 30-9-2002. In the interest of justice and fairplay, in case the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act be given to the petitioner, even then he had not served grievance notice within one month as prescribed in section 46(1), therefore, the learned High Court was justified to dismiss the grievance petition as time-barred. It is also a settled law that it is the duty of Court to determine the question of limitation irrespective of the fact whether such plea was raised or not by virtue of section 3 of the Limitation Act. See Haji Muhammad Shah v.

Sher Khan PLD 1994 SC 294 and Province of Punjab and others v. Muhammad Hussain PLD 1993 SC 147.

6. It is yet another settled law that pure question of law can be raised at any stage of proceedings as law laid down by this Court in Haji Abdullah Khan's case PLD 1965 SC 90. It is basic principle that if a mandatory condition for the exercise of jurisdiction by a Court is not fulfilled, then the entire proceedings which follow become illegal and suffer from want of jurisdiction as law laid down by this Court in Mansib Ali's case PLD 1971 SC 124. It has been held by this Court in Muhammad Sarwar v. The State PLD 1969 SC 278 that a Judge must know the adage that a Judge must wear all the laws of the country on the sleeve of his robe and failure of the counsel to properly advise him is not a complete excuse in the matter. In this view of the matter that respondents did not raise objection qua bar of limitation before the Labour Court had no force.

7. In view of what has been discussed above, this petition has nor merit, therefore, the same is dismissed. Leave is refused.