HOUSE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION and another vs Syed MUHAMMAD
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the management of the House Building Finance Corporation against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had awarded back-benefits to the respondent for the period he remained out of service prior to his reinstatement. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal erred in awarding back-benefits without conducting an inquiry to determine if the respondent had remained gainfully employed or idle during the intervening period. The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's judgment was legally defective because it failed to record evidence—either oral or by affidavit—regarding the respondent's employment status during the decade-long period in question. The Court emphasized that upon remand, the Tribunal is obligated to allow parties to adduce evidence to establish whether the employee was gainfully employed elsewhere. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the Tribunal's judgment and remanded the case for a fresh decision, directing the Tribunal to conduct the necessary inquiry and reach a conclusion based on evidence.
- Is the Federal Service Tribunal required to conduct an inquiry into whether an employee was gainfully employed elsewhere before awarding back-benefits?
- Can a judgment awarding back-benefits be sustained if the Tribunal failed to record evidence regarding the employee's employment status during the intervening period?
- What is the procedure for the Federal Service Tribunal to follow upon the remand of a case concerning the entitlement to back-benefits?
' RANA BHAGWANDAS, J.--- Petitioner-management seeks leave to appeal against Federal Service Tribunal judgment dated 17-5-2005 allowing back-benefits to respondent No,1 for the period he remained out of job before his reinstatement.
2. In Civil Appeals Nos.1681 and 1682 of 2003 filed by both the parties against order of reinstatement without back-benefits of the petitioner, this Court vide judgment dated 6-5-2004 allowed the appeal of the respondent in relation to withholding back-benefits thereby setting aside order of the Tribunal depriving him of the back-benefits and directing treatment of intervening period as "leave of the kind due". The appeal was remanded to the Tribunal for re-consideration of the matter and assignment of plausible and convincing reasons on the question of withholding the back-benefits.
Appeal of the petitioner-management challenging reinstatement of the respondent was, however, dismissed.
3. From the trend of arguments advanced by Mr. Abdul Mujeeb Pirzada, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the petitioner and not controverted by the respondent, it is evident that, in post-remand proceedings, no enquiry was conducted by the Tribunal into the question whether the respondent remained without any job and not doing any lawful business during the intervening period, .Spread- over a decade, inasmuch as, neither any oral evidence was recorded by the Tribunal nor was it recorded on affidavits. The judgment of the Tribunal, thus, suffers from inherent legal defect and is not supported by any material on record justifying the reversal of the earlier view of the Tribunal. It is our considered opinion that after the remand of the case, the Tribunal ought to have called upon the parties to adduce in order to arrive at a definite conclusion whether the respondent remained totally idle, not performing any job and not gainfully employed anywhere else during this period. This aspect of the case was not adverted to at all and escaped the attention of the Tribunal, which can hardly be appreciated.
4. For the aforesaid facts and reasons, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained in law with the consequence that the petition is converted into appeal and allowed. Impugned judgment is set aside and case is remanded to the Tribunal for decision afresh in the light of observations recorded hereinabove.
5. Since the parties have been litigating for more than a decade hopefully the Tribunal shall decide the issue afresh as early as practicable and preferably within a period of six months. No order as to costs.