KARACHI ELECTRIC SUPPLY 'CORPORATION LTD. vs Saikh MUHAMMAD JAVAID
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal, which had set aside the dismissal of the respondent on charges of misconduct. The core legal question was whether the Tribunal erred in striking down the dismissal order and ordering de novo proceedings due to procedural irregularities in the disciplinary process. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, noting that the petitioner had admitted to material procedural failures, specifically the absence of a show-cause notice prior to the respondent's reversion, the failure to provide the inquiry report, and the denial of a personal hearing. The Court held that the Tribunal correctly identified these omissions as fatal to the disciplinary action. The key principle laid down is that the imposition of a major penalty in service matters, where allegations of fact are denied, necessitates a regular inquiry and strict adherence to procedural fairness, including the issuance of a show-cause notice and the provision of a personal hearing, failing which the penalty is illegal and unwarranted.
- Does the failure to issue a show-cause notice and provide a personal hearing in disciplinary proceedings render a major penalty illegal?
- Is a regular inquiry mandatory when a respondent denies allegations of fact involving a major penalty?
- What constitutes a question of law of public importance under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 in service matters?
- Article 212(3), Constitution of Pakistan 1973
ORDER
' RANA BHAGWANDAS, J.--- Petitioner Karachi Electric Supply Corporation is aggrieved by judgment, dated 2-11-2004 of the Federal Service Tribunal striking down dismissal order, dated 16-8-1999 passed against the respondent on the charge of misconduct. While directing reinstatement of the respondent in service the Tribunal remanded the case to the petitioner organization for holding de novo disciplinary proceedings against him strictly in accordance with law, leaving the question of back benefit upon the result of de novo inquiry.
2. We have heard Mr. Talmiz S. Bureny learned Advocate Supreme Court for the petitioner while Mr. Khalid Javed, Advocate has entered caveat on behalf of respondent.
3. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner and examination of the record it seems that allegations of the respondent in his memo. Of appeal before the Tribunal were materially admitted by the petitioner in its written comments as narrated in paragraph 4 of the impugned judgment.
Even learned counsel for the petitioner had admitted before the Tribunal that the proceedings held against the respondent suffered from material discrepancies inasmuch as no show-cause notice was issued to the respondent prior to his reversion; enquiry report was not supplied to him and he was net heard in person.
4. Upon careful consideration of the record the Tribunal recorded a finding of fact that no show- cause notice was issued to the respondent before ordering his reversion from Pay Group VI to Pay Group IV and that no show-cause notice was issued to him in the wake of inquiry. Relying upon the case-law laid down by this Court in numerous judgments dealing with the effect of absence of show-cause notice, want of personal hearing and dispensing with regular enquiry the Tribunal observed that in the instant case Enquiry Officer was too hasty without any justification; that the respondent was deprived of his defence by not providing proper opportunity to participate in the enquiry into the alleged misconduct and lastly that this being a case of major penalty involving allegations of fact being denied by the respondent, such allegations were required to be enquired into by means of a regular enquiry which was not conducted. It was in this backdrop that the Tribunal proceeded to determine that the imposition of major penalty upon the respondent was completely illegal and unwarranted.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to convince us whether the findings recorded by the Tribunal are based on no material or contrary to the evidence furnished by the parties. He is, not in a position to point out any question of law of public importance for intervention of this Court in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal in the service matters relating to terms and conditions of service. In the absence of any serious defect or inherent infirmity no question of law of public importance for grant of leave to appeal within the purview of Article 212(3) of the Constitution is made out. Thus leave to appeal is refused and .