MEHAR KHAN MEO vs HIGH COURT OF SINDH,

' RANA BHAGWANDAS, J.--- Petitioner-Additional District Judge seeks leave to appeal against judgment, dated 16-5-2006 passed by Sindh Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as to the Tribunal) dismissing his service appeal against adverse remarks for the years 1993 to 1999 recorded by Honourable Chief Justice of the Sindh High Court.

2. Appeal was heard by two Honourable Judges of the High Court constituting the Tribunal and dismissed with the observations that the remarks recorded in the years 1993 and 1994 were of advisory nature and for counselling purposes, thus, they did not constitute any adverse stigma on the career of the Officer. As regards, the remarks for the subsequent years, the Tribunal found that in response to his departmental representation petitioner was informed that such remarks were recorded by the Honourable Chief Justice after thorough enquiry from learned District and Sessions Judges under whom he had worked and from the Honourable Judges of the High Court, who, while working as District and Sessions Judge, came in touch with him. By way of reference the Tribunal had an access to the Annual Confidential Reports of the petitioner even for the period subsequent to the year 2000 and regretted to note that despite communication of adverse remarks, he had not improved his conduct and integrity as a Judicial Officer, as his integrity was invariably recorded as below average.

3. We have heard Mr. Ghulam Qadir Jatoi, learned Advocate Supreme Court at some length and gone through the impugned judgment as well as the memo. Of petition.

4. It is contended that Honourable Chief Justice was not acting as Chief Justice during the period he recorded adverse remarks against the incumbent Judicial Officer. No doubt it is correct but the fact remains that if the Annual Confidential Reports were not recorded by the former Chief Justices, successor Chief Justice is neither debarred nor disabled from recording the remarks for the period these were due in order to update record of an Officer in due course of business. In response to the petitioner's representation against the adverse remarks, he was duly informed that the Honourable Chief Justice had based his observations and formed an opinion on the basis of thorough enquiry from different District and Sessions Judges under whom the petitioner had worked and also from his colleagues on the Bench of the Sindh High Court; under whom the petitioner served while they were working as District and Sessions Judges at different places. The formation of opinion against an Officer by the Chief Justice in most of the cases is subjective as integrity is a trait of mind, which is neither visible nor tangible. Such opinions are found on different basis, as reputation of a Judicial Officer whether good or bad are never a secret and it travels very swiftly. Essentially, this being in the exercise of administrative jurisdiction of the Chief Justice, the Tribunal did not find any fault with such opinion and upheld the same.

5. Mr. Jatoi referred to an order passed by this Court in C.P.L.A. No,681-K of 1999 decided on 11-12- 2000 filed by the Government of Sindh through Additional Advocate-General Sindh against Muhammad Sagheer Rana, which was dismissed on the ground that the Additional Advocate- General was not duly authorized by the Provincial Government to prefer a petition against the judgment of the Tribunal. Since this petition was dismissed on technical ground, as being incompetent, it is hardly relevant and of no assistance to the petitioner. In case the Tribunal had expunged adverse remarks of the incumbent Judicial Officer in the said case, it would not constitute a principle of law or a precedent to be followed by this Court in other cases, as each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.

6. Having examined the case of the petitioner from every angle and, notwithstanding, the long delay in recording the Annual Confidential Reports we arc of the considered opinion that no substantial question of law of public importance is involved in the petition. Indeed no ground is made out for interference in the exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal, which on the face of is neither unreasonable or unfair nor contrary to the settled norms of justice and equity.

7. In view of what has been stated above, we find no substance in this petition, which is accordingly dismissed.