Messrs ASHRAF SUGAR MILLS LTD and another vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
This matter concerns appeals against a Lahore High Court judgment regarding the validity of a government notification fixing a 160-day crushing period for sugar mills in the Province of Punjab. The appellants challenged the notification, arguing that the limitation was discriminatory compared to other provinces and that unavoidable circumstances sometimes made it impossible to complete crushing within the prescribed 160-day timeframe. The core legal question was whether the Government possessed the competence to fix such a crushing period under the Central Excise Act, 1944. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the Government is legally competent to fix the crushing period. The Court found the notification valid and unexceptionable, noting that the High Court had correctly interpreted the departmental intent regarding the crushing season. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, establishing the principle that the executive government holds the authority to regulate industrial operations, including the duration of crushing seasons, under the powers conferred by the Central Excise Act, 1944.
- Is the Government competent to fix the crushing period for sugar mills under the Central Excise Act, 1944?
- Does the fixing of a specific crushing period by the Government constitute unlawful discrimination against sugar mills in a specific province?
- Section 12-A, Central Excise Act 1944
ORDER
' IFIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAT. IHDRY, The listed appeals are by the leave of the Court, against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 31-1-2002.
2. Learned counsel while narrating the facts of the cases, pointed out that the Government had specified the period of crushing of 160 days by the Notification No,S.R.O. 823(I)/1991 dated 28th of 1991 for the Province of Punjab. According to him, the Provincial Government had discriminated to the appellants because in the other provinces no such limitation for crushing period has 'been imposed. When we called upon him to explain as to whether the Government in exercise of powers conferred upon it under section 12-A of Central Excise Act, 1944, is not competent to fix the crushing period. He could not answer satisfactorily except saying that on account of some unavoidable circumstances at times it becomes impossible for the appellants to crush the sugarcane during the period of 160 days. It may be noted that the learned High Court after having taken into consideration arguments of parties observed as follows:- "16. We, therefore, hold that for the purpose of the said proviso in the said S.R.O. No,505(I)/90 dated 7-6-1990, crushing period will mean a period starting from 30th of November and ending on 30th June the next following year. However, we find that the respondent-Department is treating the said crushing season to mean 160 days which is less than the period of the crushing as held by us. The petitioners shall, therefore, be entitled to the benefit of the said departmental interpretation."
3. Thus we are of the opinion that as the government is competent to fix the crushing period therefore, the High Court under these B circumstances had rightly dismissed the petition holding that notification S.R.O. To be valid and order being unexceptionable, admits no interference.
Appeals are dismissed.
Cited by 3 cases
- AL-NOOR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN 2018 SCMR 1792
- AL-NOOR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED Versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN 2018 PTD 2082
- AL-NOOR SUGAR MILLS LIMITED and another vs FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others 2018 P.C.T.L.R. 1048, 2019 PLJ SC 307, 2019 P.S.C. 325, PTCL 2019 CL. 337, 2018