RASHEED alias SHEEDA and another vs STATE
This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the accused in a case registered under Sections 392 and 411 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners sought bail on grounds including a delay in the FIR, improbability of the prosecution story, lack of injury, and non-recovery of items from them. The State opposed the application, highlighting that the accused were named in the FIR, the offence falls within the prohibitory clause, and the trial has commenced. The core legal question was whether the petitioners were entitled to bail despite the commencement of the trial and whether the case qualified as one of 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court held that the petitioners were not entitled to bail, finding sufficient evidence of their involvement and noting that the case did not constitute 'further inquiry'. The Court affirmed the principle that while an accused may be entitled to bail if a case qualifies as 'further inquiry' regardless of trial status, this provision cannot be invoked on artificial grounds, and bail is generally refused once a trial has commenced.
- Does the commencement of a trial automatically bar the grant of post-arrest bail?
- Can an accused claim bail as a matter of right if a case is considered one of 'further inquiry' under Section 497(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Is it permissible to conduct a deeper appreciation of evidence at the bail stage?
- Section 392, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 411, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 13, Arms Ordinance 1965
- Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
ORDER
After dismissal of the application for bail after arrest by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Burewala, the petitioners have approached this Court for grant of bail after arrest in a case F.I.R. No. 117/06 dated 20.5.2006, registered under Sections 392/411 P.P.C. at Police Station Sahooka, District Vehari.
2. Briefly the prosecution story as narrated in the F.I.R. is that on the night between 24/25.4.2006 the complainant was sleeping in the courtyard of his house. At about 3.00 a.m. three persons with muffled faces barged into his house, upon which he woke up. On the alarm raised by the complainant, his brother Arif and wife Mst. Nawaz Bibi also woke up. The accused aimed their rifles at the complainant party and removed ear rings from the ears of wife of the complainant. During the scuffle with the complainant party, the faces of the accused were un-muffled and the complainant recognized them. Thereafter, the accused party filed away. Later on, the complainant came to know that the same accused had committed similar offence in the house of one Muhammad Akbar also.
3. In support of the petition, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that there is a delay of 26 days in lodging the F.I.R; that the story as narrated in the F.I.R. is highly improbable; that during the occurrence no injury was received by the complainant party and lastly he has contended that during the investigation, nothing was recovered from tie petitioners.
4. Learned counsel for the State assisted by learned counsel for the complainant opposed this bail application on the ground that the accused have been specifically named in the F.I.R; that the offence falls within the prohibitory clause; that the charge has already been framed and the case is fixed for recording of evidence on 27.11.2006. Learned counsel for the State has further submitted that the petitioners are previous record holders, inasmuch as, Riaz Hussain petitioner is involved in two cases bearing F.I.R. No. 150/97 and F.I.R. No. 168/97 registered under Sections 392/411 PPC and 13 of Arms Ordinance of 1965, respectively, registered at Police Station Thingi. As far as, Rasheed @ Sheeda petitioner is concerned, he is involved in a case registered under Section 392 PPC, vide F.I.R.
No. 12/01, at Police Station Guggu.
5. When the learned counsel for the petitioner was confronted with the objection of the State counsel regarding the start of trial, he contended that when the case of accused becomes that of further inquiry, he can be released on bail despite the start of trial. He has placed reliance upon "2002 M LD 712" and "2006 PCr.LJ 547".
6. After hearing both the parties and perusing the record, it has been noticed that the petitioners are specifically named in the F.I.R. According to the prosecution, they have committed the offence of robbery while entering into the house of the complainant at night time and during the scuffle, they were duly identified by the complainant and other eyewitnesses. According to the prosecution version, prior to committing said offence, accused had committed robbery in the house of Muhammad Akbar also. During the investigation the statements of eye-witnesses were recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Apart from, three ye-witnesses of first occurrence, Muhammad Ashraf and Muhammad Ramzan P.Ws supported the prosecution version, as far as the commission of offence in the house of Muhammad Akbar was concerned. Ear rings looted in the occurrence were duly recovered from Munawwar Hussain co-accused. The offence under Section 392 PPC falls within the prohibitory clause. Prima facie, no reason for false implication of the accused appears on the record. During the investigation the petitioners were found guilty. Other contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner relate to the deeper appreciation of evidence which is not permissible at bail stage.
7. As far as, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, regarding the right of the accused to bail despite start of trial is concerned, the authorities relied upon by him are not applicable to the present case. There is no cavil with the proposition that when the case of some accused becomes that of further inquiry, he can claim the bail as a matter of right and start of trial cannot cause any hindrance in his way. But bail under said principle can only be granted when the case becomes that of further inquiry in the real sense and for that matter, provision of Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. cannot be stretched so much and the case cannot be held to be that of further inquiry just on the imaginary and artificial grounds. As far as the present case is concerned, there are sufficient reasons to believe that the petitioners are involved in a case which falls within the prohibitory clause and the case is not found to be of further inquiry. In the eventuality of the start of the trial, bail is normally refused. Reliance in this regard is placed upon "1980 SCM R 203".
8. For all the reasons stated above, the petition is found to be meritless, hence is dismissed.
9. Before parting with the order it is observed that the trial Court would not be influenced by the findings recorded in this order and the case would be decided on the basis of evidence recorded during the trial.