AHMAD and others vs ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE and others
This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, which dismissed the petitioners' constitutional petition against the concurrent closure of their evidence. The core legal question involves whether the trial court was justified in closing the petitioners' evidence upon their failure to deposit the requisite process fee and diet money for summoning witnesses. The Supreme Court held that the trial court rightly closed the evidence as the petitioners failed to provide proof of deposit, a fact conceded by their counsel. The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower forums, establishing the principle that where a party fails to deposit process fee and diet money for witnesses despite opportunities, the trial court is legally justified in closing their side, and such orders warrant no constitutional interference.
- Is a trial court justified in closing a party's evidence when the party fails to deposit the process fee and diet money for summoning witnesses?
- Whether the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition against the closure of evidence warrants interference by the Supreme Court when default is admitted?
- Order XVII Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
ORDER
' IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.---This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment, dated 9-1-2002 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench.
2. Precisely stating the facts of the case are that during hearing of the suit for possession the side of respondents/plaintiffs was closed in terms of Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. On 27th January, 2000.
Appeal filed against this order by her was allowed by the Additional District Judge, on 30th March, 2001 and case was remanded to the trial Court with the direction to decide the same afresh in accordance with law, after granting one opportunity to respondents to produce evidence.
Thereafter, evidence was produced by her and petitioners/defendants were called upon to lead their evidence but they could not do the needful as such vide order, dated 11th September, 2001, their side was closed. This order was challenged by the petitioners through appeal before the Additional District Judge, who dismissed the same on 21st September, 2001. Against the order of the trial Court and the Revisional Court the constitution petition was filed, which has been dismissed by means of impugned judgment.
3. We have heard the learned counsel and have also gone through the impugned judgment, carefully. A perusal of impugned judgment indicates that a statement was made on behalf of petitioners that they had deposited process fee and diet money of the witnesses, who were required to be summoned by the Court. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners before the high Court was asked to prove deposit of the process fee and diet money but he failed to do so and sought adjournment. Thereafter case was again taken up and learned counsel was called upon to furnish proof of depositing the process fee and diet money but he failed to do so and under these circumstances the High Court dismissed the writ petition. Even today learned counsel for the petitioners, when questioned, candidly conceded that clerk of the Advocate appearing for the petitioners before the trial Court could not deposit process fee and diet money. In such view of the facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the learned trial Court had no option but to close the evidence of the petitioners. Since the order of the trial Court being just and proper has been maintained in the revision and the writ petition by the learned revisional Court and High Court vide orders, dated 30-3-2001 and 9-1-2002 respectively, therefore, impugned judgment admits no interference because no question of law is involved.
' Thus for the foregoing reasons we see no substance in instant petition as such same is dismissed and leave to appeal is declined.