CHIRAGH DIN vs MUMTAZ ALI & another
This criminal appeal was filed under Section 417(2-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 challenging the acquittal of respondents from the charge of murder under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, which was passed by the trial court on the basis of a compromise. The core legal question was whether the compromise and subsequent acquittal were vitiated due to alleged coercion and impersonation before the trial court. The Lahore High Court held that the judicial record and statements recorded by the trial judge import absolute verity and cannot be contradicted by subsequent oral assertions or affidavits. The court established the principle that judicial proceedings and statements of a judge regarding occurrences in court are conclusive and must be treated as absolute verity, dismissing the appeal in limine under Section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.
- Whether a judicial record and the statement of a judge regarding proceedings in court can be contradicted by affidavits or oral assertions?
- Can an acquittal based on a compromise under Section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be set aside on the ground of coercion without dislodging the official record?
- What is the evidentiary value of a statement recorded by a trial judge during court proceedings?
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 417(2-A), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 345, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 421, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
ORDER
M. Bilal Khan, J.--Chiragh Din son of Mian Eida, the appellant (complainant of case F.I.R. No, 556/2005, registered with Police Station Kahna Nau, district Lahore for an offence under Section 302/34 P.P.C.), by filing this appeal under Section 417(2-A) Cr.P.C. has called in question the judgment of acquittal of Respondents No, 1 and 2, namely, Mumtaz Ali son of Chiragh Din and Maqsood Ali son of Mumtaz Ali of the charge of murder of Akhtar Ali deceased passed on 15.1.2007 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties.
2. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the impugned judgment was illegal and unlawful because neither the appellant as also the other legal heirs of the deceased, namely, Mst. Sakina Bibi and Mst. Bushra Bibi, his mother and widow, respectively, had entered into compromise with the respondents nor had they voluntarily made application under Section 345 Cr.P.C. or got recorded their statements before the learned trial Court, however, it was all done under coercion and that the compromise under coercion or threat was no compromise/agreement in the eyes of law.
3. After hearing the learned counsel as also the appellant, who is present in person, it has been observed that there is contradiction between the grounds urged by the learned counsel and the assertion of the appellant that he had never appeared before the learned trial Court and somebody else was produced before it because the statement made by the appellant before the learned trial Court on 11.1.2007 clearly reveals that he had appeared before the learned trial Court and got recorded his statement acknowledging compromise arrived at between him and the accused party. He was duly identified by his counsel Muhammad Raza, Advocate and the learned trial Court while recording statement of the appellant had clearly mentioned therein that a copy of his N.I.C. No, 35200-1567064-3 was produced, whereas original whereof was seen and returned.
Perusal of the impugned judgment as also the record available on the file reveals that there was no illegality in the proceedings initiated by the learned trial Court and sanctity is attached thereto.
There is no reason to disbelieve the learned trial Court.
4. The superior Courts have consistently held that the judicial record and the statement of the Judge should be regarded as conclusive, and that neither the affidavits of bystanders or counsel, nor any other evidence can be admissible to contradict the judicial record and the statement of the Judge. In Reg. V. Pestanji Dinsha and another [(1873)] (10 Bombay H.C.R. 75), it was inter-alia held that statement of the Judge must be considered as absolute verity and his statement ought to be taken precisely as a record and must be acted upon in the same manner as on a record of Court, which of itself imports absolute verity. It was further observed in the said report that the law has made the Judge the final authority as to what takes place before him at a trial; and that authority must be recognized.
5. Resultantly, there being no merit in this appeal, the same is dismissed in limine under Section 421 Cr.P.C.