Dr. ASHFAQ AHMAD KHAN vs Mst. SAMINA KHAN and others
This petition for leave to appeal arises from a civil dispute concerning the validity of an Arbitration Council's order regarding divorce and maintenance. The petitioner challenged an order dated 16-6-1973, which declared his divorce effective and awarded maintenance to his former wife. After a failed revision petition before the Collector, the petitioner filed a civil suit in 1989, which was initially decreed in his favor. However, the High Court set aside these judgments, ruling the suit time-barred. The core legal question was whether the petitioner's suit, filed over a decade after the Arbitration Council's order, was maintainable and whether the underlying order was void, thereby exempting it from limitation periods. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the petition for leave to appeal. The Court held that the petitioner's challenge was grossly barred by time, as he failed to demonstrate any legal infirmity or voidness in the Arbitration Council's proceedings that would circumvent the statutory limitation period. The judgment reaffirms that civil suits challenging administrative orders must be filed within the prescribed limitation period absent a showing of nullity.
- Can a civil suit challenging an order of an Arbitration Council be maintained if filed more than a decade after the order was passed?
- Does the absence of an application under Section 9 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 render an Arbitration Council's maintenance order void?
- Is a suit challenging an administrative order subject to the limitation period prescribed by the Limitation Act 1908?
- Section 9, Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961
- Section 14, Limitation Act 1908
- Article 120, Limitation Act 1908
' FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J.--- The petitioner seeks leave to appeal from judgment dated 19- 9-2003 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in Civil Revision No,1405 of 1996.
2. The petitioner had married the respondent No,1 on 1-6-1972. Subsequently, he pronounced a divorce upon her and gave a notice dated 29-11-1976 to the Chairman, Union Committee, Ward No,21, Gulberg, Lahore, who constituted an Arbitration Council. The Chairman of the Arbitration Council, by order, dated 16-6-1973 declared the divorce as having become effective and directed the petitioner to pay maintenance of $ 3,000 (U.S. Dollars three thousand) to the respondent No,1 for the Iddat period from 5-2-1973 to 5-5-1973. He filed a revision petition on 25-2-1984 against order/certificate dated 16-6-1973, which was dismissed by the District. Collector, Lahore, by order, dated 24-5-1988 as barred by time. The petitioner instituted a suit for declaration, on 20-6-1989, before the Civil Judge, Lahore thereby challenging orders, dated 16-6-1973 and 24-5-1988 by the respondents Nos.2 and 3, which was decreed in his favour vide judgment and decree, dated 19-10- 1992. The respondent-lady filed appeal there against which was dismissed on 27-9-1995, by the Additional District Judge. The respondent No,1 therefore, filed Civil Revision No,1405 of 1996 which was accepted by the Lahore High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 19-9-2003.
Consequently, the judgments dated 19-10-1992 and 279-1995 of both the Courts below were set aside and the suit of the petitioner was dismissed. Hence this petition for leave to appeal.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the cause of action had arisen to the petitioner to institute a suit after proceedings for execution of the decree were commenced and not from the of issuance of certificate or order dated 16-6-1973, passed by the Arbitration Council.
The learned counsel further submitted that in the absence of any application under section 9 of the Muslim, Family Law, Ordinance, 1961, the Arbitration Council was not empowered to grant any maintenance to the respondent No,1 Since the order passed or certificate issued by Arbitration Council was void, therefore, no limitation would apply. The revision petition before the Collector and the suit filed by the petitioner on 20-6-1989 were to be treated as within time in view of section 14 and Article 120 of the Limitation Act.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at some length and have also perused the available record. We find that as against the certificate and order dated 16-6-1973, the petitioner moved Revision petition before the Collector in 1986 after a period of more than 13 years. Therefore, the suit instituted by,the petitioner on 20-6-1989 before the Civil Court was rightly held by the High Court as barred by time. A Needless to observe that the revision petition was also dismissed by the Collector being grossly barred by time. The learned counsel failed to satisfy us as to how the orders of the Arbitration Council and of the Collector were void. We do not find any legal infirmity in the impugned judgment of the High Court, which is just and fair. This is not a fit case for grant of leave to appeal.
5. In this view of the matter, we do not find any merit in this petition which is dismissed and leave to appeal is refused accordingly.