IKRAM-UL-HAQ vs IRFAN WAHEED and 2 others
This criminal appeal was filed by the complainant against the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khushab, dated 2-2-2007, which acquitted respondents Nos. 1 and 2 of charges under Sections 452, 342, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reversing their trial court conviction. The core legal question was whether the appellate court's judgment of acquittal was perverse or based on a misreading of evidence, justifying interference by the High Court. The Lahore High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal. The Court held that there was an inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, and the alleged injured victim and witnesses were not medically examined without any explanation. The Court reiterated the established principle that a judgment of acquittal carries a double presumption of innocence and should not be interfered with unless it is shown to be perverse, arbitrary, or fanciful.
- When can an appellate court interfere with a judgment of acquittal?
- What is the effect of an unexplained delay in lodging an FIR and the failure to medically examine injured witnesses on the prosecution case?
- Does a judgment of acquittal carry a double presumption of innocence in favor of the accused?
- Section 452, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 342, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 148, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 342, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 340(2), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 421, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
' SARDAR MUHAMMAD ASLAM, J.--- This appeal challenges acquittal of the respondents by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khushab vide his judgment, dated 2-2-2007 in case registered vide F.I.R. No,145, dated 21-9-2002 under sections 452/342/148/149, P.P.C. With Police Station Gujial District Khushab.
2. Precisely, case vide F.I.R. No,145 was registered on 2-2-2007 at the instance of complainant narrated that accused persons while armed with weapons entered into his residential house, while scaling over the wall forcibly entered in his residential room of the house, dragged his son Muhammad Irfan and gave him severe beating with their respective weapons. On hue and cry witnesses were attracted at the spot who tried to rescue his son but accused persons did not stop beating and succeeded to kidnap his son. Case was investigated the Investigating Officer who after finding the accused guilty submitted report under section 173, Cr.P.C. Charge was framed against them. Seven prosecution witnesses were examined. Statements of the respondents were recorded under section 342, P.P.C. Accused did not opt to make statement on oath as required under section 340(2), Cr.P.C. The learned trial Court after hearing the parties convicted, under section 452, P.P.C., respondents Nos.1 and 2 and sentenced them to four years' R.I. And six months under section 342, P.P.C. An appeal was filed which came up before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, who vide his judgment acquitted respondents Nos.1 and 2 against which appellant has preferred the present appeal.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the prosecution evidence has been misconstrued qua respondents; since incriminating evidence was available which has not been given due consideration by the learned Appellate Court.
4. Heard. Record perused.
5. There is an inordinate unexplained delay in lodging in F.I.R. The injured ladies and victim Irfan who claims to have been injured during the incident were neither medically examined nor reason advanced for their non-examination; therefore, this did cause dent to the prosecution case.
6. The learned Appellate Court on appreciation of evidence recorded acquittal of the respondents through well-reasoned judgment. The reasons advanced by the learned Appellate Court for recording acquittal of the respondents have not been found by this Court to be either perverse or fanciful. The conclusion arrived at by the learned Appellate Court is such that any reasonable Court could have arrived at the same upon a fair assessment of evidence available on the record.
The learned Appellate Court has rightly set aside the judgment passed by the learned trial Court. In these circumstances, I have found no occasion for interference with the impugned judgment of acquittal. Double presumption of innocence is attached to a judgment of acquittal passed by the competent Court.
7. For what has been discussed above, this appeal having no merit is dismissed under section 421, Cr.P.C.