Pakistan Case Law
2008 SCMR 428

Malik MUHAMMAD KHAQAN vs TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF KARACHI (KPT) and another

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Citation2008 SCMR 428
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Case No.Civil Petitions Nos.4-K and 5-K of 2006
Date2007-03-07
Judge(s)Saiyed Saeed Ashhad and Hamid Ali Mirza
Authored bySaiyed Saeed Ashhad
ResultPetition dismissed
AI Summary — generated from this judgment; read the full text below and verify before relying on it.

These civil petitions were filed against a consolidated judgment of the High Court of Sindh, which allowed civil revisions and set aside concurrent decrees granted by the trial and appellate courts in favor of the petitioner. The core legal questions involved whether a temporary licensee acquires a vested right to claim a declaration of title under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and whether the High Court has jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. to set aside concurrent findings of fact. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and refused leave to appeal, holding that temporary permission or a license confers no vested right in immovable property and cannot form the basis of a suit for declaration under Section 42. Furthermore, the Supreme Court affirmed that the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. can interfere with concurrent findings if they are contrary to the evidence on record, ignore material facts, or suffer from a grave illegality or violation of law.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Does a temporary license create a vested right in immovable property sufficient to maintain a suit for declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act?
  • Can the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure set aside concurrent findings of fact if they are contrary to law or material evidence on record?
  • Is a license to use immovable property revocable by the grantor?
Laws & provisions referred
  • section 42 of Specific Relief Act
  • section 115, C.P.C.
suit for declarationvested rightlicenseerevisional jurisdictionconcurrent findingsreversal of findingsSection 42 Specific Relief ActSection 115 CPC

ORDER

' SAIYED SAEED ASHHAD, J.--- These civil petitions have been filed against the consolidated judgment of Sindh High Court, Karachi, dated 19-12-2006 in Civil Revisions Nos.47 of 1995 and 256 of 2002.

2. The dispute is with regard to plots of land measuring 225 sq. Meters and 370 sq. Meters area (situated at Timber Pond, Kemari, Fish Harbour, West Wharf, Karachi) (hereinafter referred to as the "demised plots"). One of the two demised plots was temporarily allotted to the petitioner for carrying out business on payment of Rs,21,400 subject to the sanction by Karachi Port Trust Board.

During the course of time the petitioner was dispossessed from the plot as temporary and conditional permission was cancelled/rescinded by the Karachi Port Trust which led the petitioner to file suits for specific performance under section 42 of Specific Relief Act for declaration to the effect he was legally entitled one of the two plots in question. The said suits were decreed of the trial Court were dismissed. Respondent assailed the concurrent findings of the trial and Appellate Courts before the High Court by way of revisions in respect of two plots. High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction after going through the material on record and hearing the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties came to the conclusion that the petitioner had failed to establish any vested right in respect of the demised plots and his suits for declaration under section 42 of Specific Relief Act were not maintainable. The document relied upon by him in support of his entitlement for allotment is the order conferring a right on the petitioner to use the demised plot(s) as a licensee and a licence neither confers any vested right in the licensee nor a licensee can claim its continuation for an unlimited period of time as the same is revocable. It is further observed that both the trial Court and Appellate Court had failed to take into consideration very material facts and provision of law which resulted in grave and serious illegalities being committed by them in decreeing the suits by the trial Court and subsequently, by confirmation thereof by the Appellate Court. On the above views High Court -found that the suits were not maintainable and set aside the judgment and decrees of the Appellate Court and trial Court ordering dismissal of the suits.

3. We asked Mr. Akhlaq Ahmed Siddiqui, learned Advocate-onRecord to show us any document from which it could be established that the petitioner had acquired a vested right in respect of the demised plot(s) which was necessary for filing a suit for declaration of title/ownership in respect of the immovable property under section 42 of Specific Relief Act. He was unable to point out to us any document or material, in support of the establishment of vested right. He, however, insisted that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. Could not set aside the concurrent findings of facts of the two Courts below and in being so the High Court committed grave and serious illegality. The contention advanced by Mr. Akhlaq Ahmed Siddiqui, learned Advocate-on-Record is without any substance. This Court has consistently held that when finding of the facts of the trial and Appellate Courts are contrary to the evidence and material on record or are against law when the revisional Court would have jurisdiction to rectify the same so as to bring the findings in consonance with the evidence on record or to remove the illegality surfacing from the judgment. Similarly if the revisional Court finds any violation of provision of law by a Court or ignorance of law then it is vested with the authority to set aside the concurrent findings and substitute its own findings.

4. For the foregoing facts, reasons and discussion this petition is found to be without any substance and is accordingly dismissed. Leave to appeal is refused.

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