MUHAMMAD UMAR vs MUHAMMAD TUFAIL and others
This petition for leave to appeal challenges an order of the Sindh High Court which dismissed the petitioner's second appeal on the ground that it was time-barred. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court correctly calculated the limitation period for filing a second appeal under the relevant statutory provisions. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the judgment of the First Appellate Court was dated 27-10-2003, and the decree was drawn on 8-12-2003. The second appeal was filed on 19-1-2004, which fell well within the 90-day limitation period prescribed by Article 156 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had committed an error of law by miscalculating the limitation period, as the appeal was clearly filed within the statutory timeframe. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the case to the High Court for a decision on the merits, establishing that limitation periods must be strictly calculated from the date of the decree or order as provided by law.
- What is the limitation period for filing a second appeal before the High Court under the Limitation Act, 1908?
- Does the period of limitation for a second appeal commence from the date of the judgment or the date the decree is drawn and signed?
- Can an appellate court dismiss an appeal as time-barred if it was filed within the statutory period prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1908?
- Article 156, Schedule to the Limitation Act 1908
' RANA BHAGWANDAS, J.--- This petition is directed against Sindh High Court order, dated 25-4- 2005 dismissing second appeal of the petitioner against the judgment. Of an Additional District Judge, as barred by time.
2. On the last date of hearing, when this petition came up for hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that second appeal before the High Court was filed within 90 days as per Article 156 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908; that the decree passed by the First Appellate Court was drawn and signed on 8-12-2003 whereas the memo. Of second appeal was preferred in the office of the High Court on 19-1-2004. Apppal before the High Court was, therefore, not barred by time, as erroneously reckoned by learned Judge in Chambers, Having noted the submissions, we ordered notice to the respondents, pursuant to which respondent No,3 has entered appearance in person. Notices were issued to all the respondents at their last known addresses and, in law, are presumed to have been duly served. Nevertheless they have, not need to appear.
3. We have heard Chaudhry. Muhammad Iqbal learned Advocate Supreme Court for the petitioner and gone through the impugned order. In this case, judgment of the First Appellate Court is dated 27-10-2003 whereas decree was drawn on 8-12-2003. As per Article 156 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act period provided for preferring an appeal before the High Court is 90 days from the date of the order or a decree. In the instant case, as per record, second appeal was filed before the High Court on 19-1-2004, therefore, it was clearly within 90 days from the date of judgment as well as the decree appealed from. It appears that this provision of law escaped the attention of the learned Judge in the High Court, who proceeded to dismiss the appeal under wrong impression that it was out of time.
4. Since the error of law is apparent on the face of record, this petition is converted into appeal and allowed. Consequently, impugned order of the High Court is set aside and case remanded to High Court for decision afresh on merits strictly in accordance with law, after notice to parties and opportunity of hearing to them.
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