SINDH SUGAR CORPORATION LIMITED vs Messrs MAQBOOL ASSOCIATES, KARACHI
This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Sindh High Court, which had refused to restore a High Court Appeal that was previously dismissed for non-prosecution and default in appearance. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the petitioner had demonstrated sufficient cause to justify the condonation of a significant delay in filing an application for the re-admission of the appeal. The petitioner had failed to file an application under Order XLI, Rule 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 within the prescribed thirty-day period, instead waiting nearly four years to seek restoration. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's conduct throughout the proceedings was casual, indifferent, and unsatisfactory. Consequently, the Court found no justification for exercising its discretion to grant indulgence or to treat the petitioner differently from an ordinary litigant. The Court affirmed the High Court's dismissal, reiterating the principle that a party seeking restoration must establish sufficient cause for delay and that procedural negligence does not warrant judicial leniency.
- Does the failure to file an application for re-admission of an appeal within the statutory period constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay?
- Is a corporate entity entitled to special treatment or greater indulgence than an ordinary litigant when seeking restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-prosecution?
- Does a casual and indifferent attitude in prosecuting a legal remedy preclude the exercise of judicial discretion in favor of the applicant?
- Order XLI Rule 19, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
ORDER
RANA BHAGWANDAS, J.--- Petitioner is aggrieved by Sindh High Court order dated 14-3-2006 whereby its prayer for re-admission of High Court Appeal dismissed for non-prosecution and default in appearance on 2-5-2002 was declined.
2. Instead of moving an application under Order XLI, rule 19, Civil Procedure Code, 1908 within thirty days, petitioner, for the first time moved such application on 26-1-2006, seeking condonation of delay on flimsy grounds, which was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court and dismissed vide order impugned in this petition.
3. We have heard Mr. Akhlaq Ahmad Siddiqui, learned Advocateon-Record for the petitioner and gone through the facts and circumstances leading to the impugned order of the High Court.
Perusal of the order clearly tends to show that the conduct and attitude of the petitioner- Corporation in prosecuting the remedy before the High Court was casual, indifferent and far from being satisfactory. At any event, no adequate ground for special treatment other than an ordinary litigant to the petitioner, muchless a "sufficient cause", for exercise of indulgence and discretion in favour of the petitioner is made out. Law is well-settled and we may refer to Zulfiqar Ali v. Lal Din 1973 SCM R 573, which fully supports the view taken by the High Court and reaffirmed by us.
4. For the aforesaid facts, circumstances and reasons, there is no ground for interference and no case for grant of leave is made out. Petition is, therefore, dismissed.