ABDUL HAMID ETC. vs GHULAM RASOOL
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld a decree in a pre-emption suit. The core legal questions were whether the petitioners could raise a new plea of limitation regarding court fees at the appellate stage, and whether the lower appellate court erred in reversing the trial court's finding on the issue of waiver. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners could not raise a new plea of limitation for the first time in the Supreme Court, as it was not urged in the High Court. Regarding the waiver plea, the Court affirmed the High Court's finding that the evidence presented by the defendants was insufficient to establish waiver, noting that waiver in pre-emption suits requires strong, cogent evidence. The Court dismissed the petitions in limine, finding no merit in the arguments presented, thereby upholding the lower court's decision in favour of the respondent.
- Can a party raise a new plea of limitation regarding court fees for the first time in a petition for special leave to appeal?
- What standard of evidence is required to establish a plea of waiver in a pre-emption suit?
- Can an appellate court reverse a trial court's finding on waiver when the evidence provided by the defendant is based on hearsay or lack of personal knowledge?
- Section 19, Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913
- Section 20, Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913
ORDER
1. ABDUL KADIR SHAIKH, J.-Ghulam Rasool, respondent herein, filed a pre-emption suit against the petitioners which was resisted inter alia on the plea that the plaintiff had waived his right of pre- emption. The trial Judge accepted the plea of waiver and dismissed the suit but on appeal that Additional District Judge, Shaikhupura reversed this finding and decreed the suit in plaintiff's favour.
2. Petitioner's Second Appeal in the Lahore High Court failed, and they now seek special leave to appeal.
3. Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Chahal, learned counsel for the petitioners raised a totally new plea before us that the suit was time-barred for the reason that on the day the plaint was filed it was not property stamped. Since this point was not urged by the petitioners in support of their appeal in the High Court, they cannot be allowed to raise it in support of this petition.For special leave to appeal from the judgment of the High Court.
4. Learned counsel then submitted that the learned Additional District Judge has erred in reversing the finding of the trial Judge. This point has already been examined by the learned Single Judge in the High Court and he rightly rejected it for the following reasons.
5. "I have myself examined the record of statement of three witnesses produced by the appellant. D.
6. W. 1 Muhammad Iqbal is a Lambar--dar but he stated that he had only heard that the respondents had refused to purchase the land from the vendor. D. W. 2 Sardar Muhammad had admitted in cross-examination that be was not present at the time of bargain struck between the parties in respect of the suit land. D: W. 1 Abdul Hamid is the defendant himself. His statement cannot be taken as granted. Waiver requires strong evidence in a suit for pre-emption and one instance is provided by sections 19 and 20 of the Pre-emption Act. Thus, no cogent evidence has been produced by the appellant to establish the plea of waiver."
7. No exception can be taken with these views, and we, therefore, find no merit in the point raised by the learned counsel.
8. Learned counsel stated that the facts and the pleas in support of bot', these petitions are identical.
9. We, therefore, dismiss both these petition in lirnine.