ADIL NAVEED vs NAZIR AHMAD KHAN Etc.S
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal that was barred by 67 days. The core legal question was whether sufficient cause had been shown to condone the delay in filing the petition, specifically regarding the explanation for the time taken in obtaining the certified copy of the High Court's order and the alleged detention of the petitioner's agent. The Supreme Court held that the application for condonation of delay failed to explain each day of the limitation period as required by law, and further noted that the petitioner's agent was actively pursuing his own legal proceedings during the relevant period, demonstrating no physical or other inability to collect the copy. The petition was accordingly dismissed as time-barred. The key principle laid down is that an applicant seeking condonation of delay must provide a sufficient cause explaining each day of the delay, and general assertions of inability are insufficient when record evidence demonstrates active engagement in other legal proceedings.
- Does an application for condonation of delay require an explanation for each day of the limitation period?
- Can detention under Martial Law of an agent serve as sufficient cause for condonation of delay when records show active pursuit of separate litigation during the same period?
ORDER
KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN, J.-This petition 1S barred by 67 days. The petitioner has filed an application for condonation of delay with reference towhich the learned counsel argued that the order of the High Court was passed on 26-6-1979 and the petitioner had applied for its copy on 21- 7-1979 through his uncle Sufi Ghulam Mohyuddin by name and though the copy was ready on 8-8- 1979 but it was received on 12-I1-1979. He submitted that the copying agency of the Lahore High Court had not given any date for the delivery of the copy and it was for this reason that the copy was received on 12-11-1979, It was further argued that Sufi Ghulam Mohyuddin uncle of the petitioner was detained under Martial Law on 22-10-1 979, with the result that he could not follow up the matter for taking delivery of the copy and nor could he pass any relevant information on the subject to the petitioner. We have gone through the application and the pleas taken therein. In our opinion the applic--ation does not explain, as the law is, each day of the limitation and in our opinion it is liable to be dismissed on this short ground. We hold accordingly.
2. However, learned counsel for the respondents (caveators) has brought to our notice that the aforesaid Sufi Ghulam Mohyuddin had filed a writ petition of his own in the High Court before 6-8- 1979. The arguments in that writ petition were heard on 6-8-1979 and the judgment therein. Was announced on 12-8-1978. Sufi Ghulam Mohyuddin then filed an Inter-Court Appeal being 286 of 1979 in which he gave a power of attorney to his counsel on 16-8-1979. The Inter-Court Appeal was admitted on 28-8-1979. From these details and particulars he asserted that Sufi Ghulam Mohyuddin was in Lahore during the period mentioned above and there is nothing on the record to show that if he could follow up his own personal writ petition why he could not follow up the matter of receiving copy in the case of the present petitioner. These details and particulars have not been denied before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner. If examined in the aforesaid light it becomes crystal clear that there was no impediment or any physical or other inability in the way of Sufi Ghulam' Mohyuddin to collect the copy. The result is that looked at from whatever angle, there does not exist any sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The petition its dismissed as time- barred.