THE STATE vs MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN and others
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the High Court of Sindh, which quashed criminal proceedings pending before the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Nawabshah. The underlying case involved police officials accused of murdering the complainant's husband, Rasool Bux Brohi, and subsequently misrepresenting the incident as a police encounter involving a dacoit. The core legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court correctly exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 to quash criminal proceedings at a pre-trial stage. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal, observing that the High Court's decision required scrutiny against established legal principles. The Court emphasized that where a prima facie case of an offence exists, the ordinary course of trial should not be deflected or interrupted through the invocation of inherent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that the inherent powers of the High Court are not to be used to bypass the trial process when evidence of an offence is present.
- Can the High Court exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings when a prima facie case exists?
- Should the ordinary course of a criminal trial be deflected by the invocation of inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Section 364, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 342, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 201, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 202, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 354, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
' MUHAMMAD MOOSA K. LEGHARI, J.--- The petition for leave to appeal arises out of an order, dated 24-7-2008 passed by learned Single Judge of High Court of Sindh. By the said order the proceedings of Sessions Case No,215 of 2006 pending in the Court of IInd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Nawabshah, under sections 364, 302, 342, 201, 202/34, P.P.C. Registered at Police Station Sakrand were quashed.
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the filing of present petition are that on the complaint of Mst.
Lai Bibi F.I.R. No,101 of 2006 under sections 354, 302, 342, 201, 202/34, P.P.C. Was registered at Police Station Sakrand, District Nawabshah on 21-7-2006 alleging therein that the respondents/police officials caused murder of her husband Rasool Bux Brohi on 10-7-2006 and claimed the deceased to be a dacoit by name Mashooq Brohi, having been killed within the jurisdiction of Police Station Gadab Town, Karachi in a police encounter as recorded in F.I.R. No,101 of 2006 dated 12-7-2006. On completion of the investigation, respondents, all of whom were police officials except respondents Nos.50-51, were sent up to face trial. Before any evidence could be recorded by the trial Court, few of the respondents seem to have approached the High Court by moving an application under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. The High Court, through the impugned order, quashed the proceedings.
3. Notices were issued to the respondents. Respondents Nos.1 to 3 have been served and are represented.
4. We have heard Mr. Shahadat Awan, learned Prosecutor: General, Sindh for the petitioner and Mr. M. Ilyas Khan for respondents Nos.1 to 3.
5. The issue, which requires to be examined is to ascertain as to whether the quashment of the proceedings was allowed in accordance with the settled principles of law, which require that if prima facie the offence has been committed, the ordinary course of trial before the Court was not to be allowed to be deflected through an approach to inherent jurisdiction of the High Court as held in well-known case of Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan PLD 1967 SC 317 and the subsequent pronouncement of this Court in the case of A. Habib Ahmed v. M.K.G. Scott Christian and 5 others PLD 1992 SC 353, besides number of other rulings on the subject.
' Accordingly, leave to appeal is granted to examine the impugned order on the touchstone of the above mentioned rule laid down by this Court.