GHAFOOR MUHAMMAD vs ABDUR REHMAN
This matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal concerning the transfer of a plot of land situated in a Katchi Abadi in Lyallpur. The core legal question involves the entitlement of rival claimants to the transfer of proprietary rights under the Transfer of Evacuee Land (Katchi Abadi) Act, 1972, following the statutory cancellation of earlier allotments. The Supreme Court held that findings of fact rendered by the High Court regarding actual possession and ownership of alternate property—which established that the respondent was in possession and that the petitioner owned another house—were well-founded on the record and immune from interference. The Court affirmed that the petitioner failed to substantiate his claim of possession or construction. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed in limine, establishing that concurrent findings of fact by the High Court regarding possession and disqualifying ownership will not be disturbed by the apex court absent legal perversity.
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding possession and ownership of alternate property?
- Does the statutory provision of the Transfer of Evacuee Land (Katchi Abadi) Act, 1972 cancel earlier allotments of land falling within a Katchi Abadi?
- Can a claimant who owns another house successfully claim proprietary rights under the Transfer of Evacuee Land (Katchi Abadi) Act, 1972?
- Section 4, Transfer of Evacuee Land (Katchi Abadi) Act 1972
ORDER
1. ABDUL KADIR SHAIKH, J.-Facts of this case as reflected from the record before us, briefly stated, are that plot of land in dispute which is situated in Katchi Abadi, Purtap Nagar , Jhang Road, Lyallpur was originally transferred to Ghulam Rasool by the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner dated 4-3-1970. The transferee associated Abdur Rehman respondent herein, with himself, and P. T.
2. D. Was issued to Abdur Rehman on 7-3-1970.
3. However, since the plot was a part and parcel of Katchi Abadi, the allotment thereof stood cancelled as on 15-3-1972 by the statutory provisions of section 4 of the Transfer of Evacuee Land (Katchi Abadi) Act, 1972. Since a provision was made in the said Act for grant of proprietary rights in respect of such lands, Abdur Rehman made an application in this behalf. Petition Ghafoor Muhammad also made similar application in respect of the same plot. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner, however, transferred the plot to Abdur Rehman, and the petitioner's appeal was dismissed by the Additional Settlement Commissioner by the order dated 17-5-1973 on the ground that he had no concern with the disputed plot and that the appeal was also barred by time. The petitioner then approached the Settlement Commissioner in revision who allowed it on the ground that it was not clear from the record as to who was in actual possession of the plot, and he, therefore, remanded the case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for fresh disposal, after hearing all the concerned parties.
4. Abdur Rehman then challenged the order of the Settlement Commis--sioner ir. Writ Petition No. 744-R of 1974 in the Lahore High Court. Learned Single Judge in the High Court allowed the writ petition on the ground that the learned Settlement Commissioner had ignored the crucial facts of the case that the Additional Settlement Commissioner had dismissed Ghafoor Muhammad's appeal not only on merits but also for the reason that it was bearred by time, and further that Ghafoor Muhammad was not entitled to the transfer of the disputed plot for the reason that he owned another house in Peoples Colony, Lyallpur, and that even in the grounds of appeal he had not claimed the plot on the basis of his possession and that he had made cons--truction thereon.
5. The petitioner now seeks special leave to appeal from the judgment of the High Court and Raja Muhammad Muzaffar, learned counsel appearing for him submits that the finding that the petitioner is the owner of a house in Peoples Colony is totally erroneous, for, on the crucial date namely 15-3-1972 the proprietary rights in that property had not been granted to him. Learned counsel further submitted that the finding that the petitioner was not in possession of the plot is also erroneous for the reason that one of the tenants of the property had categorically stated that he took the shop on rent from the petitioner, and not from Abdur Rehman. Learned counsel further submitted that the property in fact constitutes two separate portions, one being a shop, and the other a residential house, and the bar contained in section 5 of the Act XIII of 1872 is not applicable for the reason that petitioner's claim related to conferment of proprietary rights in respect of that portion of the plot over which shop has been constructed.
6. Sheikh Abdul Karim, learned counsel for the caveator, on the other hand, controverted the points raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, and submitted that the High Court has rightly set aside the impugned order passed by the Settlement Commissioner on the ground that the entire plot was transferred to the petitioner under P. T. D. Dated 7-3-1970. Learned counsel further submitted that Abdur Rehman and not the petitioner, had raised the constructions over the disputed plot and since this plea has been accepted by the High Court, the finding 3f fact given by the High Court is not open to further challenge by the petitioner in these proceedings.
7. The findings of the learned Single Judge in the High Court that Abdu Rehman and not the petitioner, was in possession of the entire disputed plot, and that the petitioner also owned another house in Peoples Colony are supported by the facts on record. It may be mentioned in this regard the the learned Single Judge has observed that the petitioner's claim that he ha raised certain constructions on the disputed plot was not borne out by the record and bare statement of one of the tenants who had turned hostile to Abdur Rehman would not constitute sufficient evidence to show the Ghafoor Muhammad was in possession of the plot or that he had raise constructions thereon. Since these findings are rooted in facts on the record and the conclusions drawn therefrom are legitimate and do no offend against any provisions of law, interference by this Court would no arranted. these reasons, the petition is dismissed in limine.