RIZWAN ULLAH vs THE STATE and another
The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a criminal case registered under sections 324, 148, 149, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, arising from F.I.R. No. 102 of 2009. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to post-arrest bail on the ground of unconscionable delay in the conclusion of the trial, where the delay was not attributable to the petitioner. The Lahore High Court allowed the bail application, holding that an accused has a fundamental right to a speedy trial and prolonged detention without the conclusion of the trial amounts to pre-trial punishment. The court laid down the principle that unconscionable and unexplained delay in trial, not caused by the accused, constitutes a statutory and constitutional ground for the grant of post-arrest bail.
- Whether unconscionable delay in the conclusion of a trial not attributable to the accused constitutes a ground for post-arrest bail?
- Does prolonged detention without trial amount to punishment in advance?
- Is an accused entitled to bail when the trial court fails to conclude proceedings within a directed timeframe?
- Section 324, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 148, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 109, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
IQBAL HAMEED UR REHMAN, J.---The petitioner seeks post arrest bail in F.I.R. No,102 of 2009 dated 8-3-2008 under sections 324, 148, 149, 109, P.P.C. Registered at Police Station Sadar, District Mandi Baha-ud- Din.
2. Briefly, according to the F.I.R. The allegation against the petitioner is that he along with his co- accused caused injuries to the injured with 44-bore rifle.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the earlier bail application of the petitioner was disposed of with the direction to the learned trial Court to expeditiously conclude the trial within a period of four months but the trial has not so far been concluded in spite of the lapse of a period of one year and four months and the delay in trial is not attributed to the petitioner as has been held by the learned trial Court vide dismissing the bail application for the petitioner vide order dated 29- 4-2010.
4. On the other hand, bail application has been vehemently opposed by the learned counsel for the complainant. It is submitted that no fresh ground is available to the petitioner; that the statement of three P.Ws. Have already been recorded; that the co-accused Nadeem Abbas is stated to have absconded abroad. The trial is pending and at this stage, bail cannot be granted.
5. Arguments heard, record perused.
6. From the perusal of the order of the learned trial Court it is apparent that neither petitioner nor complainant can be held responsible for any delay in the trial. The trial is pending for the last one year and four months and the same delay cannot be attributed to the petitioner. Reliance can be placed to the case of Atto alias Atta Muhammad v. The State PLD 2008 Kar.177 wherein it has been held that "Delay in trial, particularly, when it amounted to abuse of process of law or of Court, had always been recognized as a ground for grant of bail. Already more than a year has passed but the trial had not been concluded. Such an unconscionable delay amounted to punishment in advance, without trial. Reliance is placed on the case of Muhammad Ashraf v. The State 2007 PCr.LJ 1636. The petitioner is behind the bars for the last more than one year and four months. It is settled principle of law that an accused has a fundamental right to demand speedy trial and cannot be detained in jail for an indefinite period as it tantamounts to punishing the accused petitioner without trial. In the case of Gul Zaman v. The State 1999 SCM1 127, in a similar situation, concession of bail was extended to the accused by the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan.
7. For the foregoing reasons, this bail application is allowed. The petitioner is admitted to bail subject to his furnishing bail bond in the sum of Rs,1,00,000 (Rupees one lac only) with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court.