INAMUR RAHIM AND Another vs The STATE
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against the High Court's refusal to grant pre-arrest bail to the petitioners, who were accused of offences under sections 302 and 307 read with section 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioners contended that their role was limited to ineffective firing in the air, which should have entitled them to bail. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's discretion in bail matters where the allegations involve serious offences. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that it is primarily a Constitutional Court and should not routinely interfere with the High Court's exercise of discretion in bail matters. The Court reaffirmed that it will only intervene if the High Court's order is such that it could not have possibly been passed under the law. Finding that the impugned order did not meet this high threshold of error, the Court declined to interfere, emphasizing the limited scope of its appellate jurisdiction in bail proceedings.
- Under what circumstances will the Supreme Court interfere with an order of the High Court regarding the grant or refusal of bail?
- Is the Supreme Court of Pakistan expected to routinely adjudicate on matters concerning the grant of bail by the High Court?
- Does the allegation of ineffective firing in a murder case automatically entitle an accused to the grant of bail?
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 307, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
1. G. SAFDAR SHAH, J.-The two petitioners herein are accused of offences under sections 1-18, 302 and 307/149, P. P. C. The only part attributed to them in the F. I. R. However, was that they had accompanied the other three co-accused (not petitioners in this case) to the place of occurrence in which one Muhammad Aslam was killed, and that they had fired in the air. Upon these allegations, the petitioners were granted pre-arrest bail by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sargodha, but on an application filed against the said order of the Additional Sessions Judge, the same was recalled by a learned Single Judge, vide his order, dated 28-3-1979.
2. After a while, the petitioners again moved the High Court for bail but the same was dismissed, as the view taken by the High Court was that "this aspect of the case had already been considered in Cr. Misc. No. 586-B of 1979. It was observed therein that the allegations in the F. I. R. Prima facie show that the respondents came to the brick-kiln after having armed themselves with fire arms and the injured eye-witnesses had fully implicated them. Even now the position remains the same.
3. When this case came up for hearing initially on 11-2-1980, it was directed that notice should go to the Assistant Advocate-General, Punjab. In response to the said notice, Sheikh Riaz Ahmad, the learned Assistant Advocate-General is present and has opposed this petition.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, contended that the only allegation made against the petitioners in the F. I. R. Was of ineffective firing, and so the High Court ought not to have refused them bail. We are afraid, there is no force in this contention. As held by this Court in Sultan Khan v.
5. Amir Khan and another (PLD 1977 SC 642), "since the Supreme Court is primarily a Constitu--tional Court and not expected to go into matters concerning grant of bail by the High Court, we do not feel called upon to interfere with the impugned order. The petition for leave to appeal is dismissed."
6. In that case, which was evidently an extreme case, it was observed by this Court "We are constrained to observe that on the facts alleged in the F. I. R. And the evidence to which the eye- witnesses are going to depose, it was not a fit case for bail. The reasons which have appealed to the learned Single Judge indicate that if any accused has merely instigated the commission of murder and fired at the victim ineffectively, he is likely to be acquitted of the offence under section
302. Such a statement of law would be clearly against the provisions of the Code".
7. It would thus be seer, that while disapproving the bail granting order of the High Court, this Court nevertheless declined to interfere with the same on the ground that it was a Constitutional Court and consequently not expected to go into matters concerning grant of bail by the High Court. In other words, unless it is shown that an order passed by the High Court in a bail matter could not have been possibly passed, this Court would decline to interfere with the same.
8. By examining the impugned order in this case, we are satisfied that it does not qualify the said test.
9. This petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed.