KARAM KHAN vs The STATE
This matter arises from a review petition filed in the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the petitioner, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, seeking a review of the court's earlier judgment dismissing his appeal. The core legal questions involved whether a review petition can be entertained on grounds of mitigating circumstances such as provocation, a subsequent compromise between the parties, or an alleged inconsistency of the death penalty with Shariat law based on a Federal Shariat Court judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that none of these grounds constituted an error apparent on the face of the record warranting a review of its earlier judgment. The key principle laid down is that a compromise between the victim's family and the convict, or subsequent developments regarding Shariat rulings, do not constitute legal grounds for reviewing a final judgment, though such matters may be relevant for executive clemency under the mercy jurisdiction.
- Whether a compromise between the families of the victim and the convict constitutes a sufficient ground for reviewing a final judgment in a criminal case?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of the lower courts on the question of sentence in the absence of an error apparent on the face of the record?
- Whether the possibility of modifying a sentence in light of a Federal Shariat Court pronouncement can be a ground for reviewing a past judgment when the law at the time of the offence stood otherwise?
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
1. DORAB PATEL, J.-The petitioner was tried with another accused for the murder of his brother-in-law by the Sessions Judge, Campbellpur, and sentenced to death. He challenged his conviction in an appeal in the Lahore High Court which was heard with the reference from the Sessions Court. His appeal was dismissed and as the death sentence was. Confirmed, he filed a petition for leave in this Court. Leave was granted, but we dismissed the appeal by our judgment dated 31-5-1980.
2. The petitioner now seeks a review of our judgment and Mr. Anwar opened his arguments by submitting that the two eye-witnesses who proved the murder were not disinterested witness. We had examined this argument and rejected it, and, as learned counsel was not able to show any error, much less an error apparent in this finding, he very fairly stated that he would seek a review only on the question of sentence.
3. In order to appreciate the grounds on which a review of the sentence passed against the petitioner is sought, we may point out that the petitioner's sister was married to the deceased and even according to the prosecution, the motive for the murder of the deceased was that the deceased had turned his wife out and served her with a notice of divorce. Therefore, learned counsel submitted that this furnished the petitioner with a genuine grievance and, as this was a mitigating cirumtance, the imposition of the death penalty was not justified.
4. Now, the question before us was not merely whether the sentence of death was to be preferred to that of life imprisonment, but whether we were justified in a second appeal in interfering with the concurrent exercise of discretion by the Courts below against the petitioner. And after examining learned counsel's submissions and the ocular evidence, we had declined to interfere with the sentence of death pronounced by the Sessions Court and confirmed by the High Court. We see no error, much less any error apparent in our refusal to interfere with this concurrent findings of the two Courts against the petitioner with regard to his plea of provocation.
5. Learned counsel then submitted that the parties had settled their disputes and forgiven the petitioner therefore, the further submission was that unless the sentence of death was altered to life imprisonment, in accordance with the compromise reached between the family of the deceased A and the family of the petitioner, it would lead to another cycle of murders. In support of this plea, learned counsel relied on a compromise deed filed before us which according to learned counsel had been signed by the families of the deceased and the petitioner. Reluctant as we are to reject a compromise, which could lead to a reduction of violence and hatred, the compromise arrived at between the parties would be no ground whatever for a review of a judgment, because the fact that the parties have decided to bury their' past hatreds does not mean that there is any error much less an errorl8 apparent in our judgment. However, this is a circumstance which could] be taken into account by the Government if the petitioner files an application in for mercy under Chapter XXIX of the Criminal Procedure Code.
6. Learned counsel's only other submission was that the imposition of the death penalty would be very harsh as the same was inconsistent with the Shariat and he relied on the latest pronouncement on this question by the Federal Shariat Court in Muhammad Riaz v. Federal Government (1) In advancing this submission learned counsel assumed that section 302, P. P. C.
7. Would be modified to the light of this judgment, but we had to construe the law as it stood at the time of the murder. Therefore, once again this plaa does not furnish any ground whatever for a review of our judgment of 3 st May, 1980, but it is open to the petitioner to raise it in an application under Chapter XXIX of the Criminal Procedure Code. With these observations, the petition is dismissed.