Pakistan Case Law
2011 YLR 2272

MUHAMMAD NAEEM vs THE STATE And Another

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Citation2011 YLR 2272
CourtLahore High Court
Case No.Criminal Miscellaneous No.9602-B of 2010
Date2010-09-17
Judge(s)Ch. Iftikhar Hussain
ResultBail granted
AI Summary — generated from this judgment; read the full text below and verify before relying on it.

This matter concerns a petition for post-arrest bail filed by the accused, Muhammad Naeem, who was charged under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for issuing dishonoured cheques. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to the grant of bail given the nature of the offence and his prior criminal record. The Court held that the offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and thus, the grant of bail was the rule rather than the exception. The Court observed that the petitioner had been incarcerated for six months and was a non-convict. Furthermore, the Court determined that the mere pendency of other cases against the accused did not constitute a sufficient ground to deny bail. Consequently, the petition was accepted, and the accused was admitted to bail upon furnishing the required security. The judgment reaffirms the principle that bail is a right in non-prohibitory offences absent exceptional circumstances.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Does the offence of issuing a dishonoured cheque under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can the mere pendency of other criminal cases against an accused be a valid ground for refusing bail in a non-prohibitory offence?
  • Is the grant of bail the rule and refusal the exception in cases not covered by the prohibitory clause of Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
Laws & provisions referred
  • Section 489-F, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
  • Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
  • Section 497(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
post-arrest baildishonoured chequenon-prohibitory clausecriminal procedurebail application

ORDER CH. IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN, J. Petitioner Muhammad Naeem through the instant petition has prayed for the post-arrest bail in case F.I.R. No.131 registered under section 489-F, P.P.C. With Police Station Civil Lines, District Faisalabad on 15-2-2010.

2. Briefly, the allegation against him as per the F.I.R. Is that he owed an amount of Rs.5,72,000 to the complainant on account of purchase of yarn (sooter) from him and in lieu thereof gave him three cheques of the said amount, which on presentation could not be encashed for want of funds.

3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record, I find that he is stated to be behind the bars for the last about six months and a previous non-convict, which has not been controverted by the other side.

5. The fact also remains that the alleged offence does not attract the prohibition contained in section 497(1), In the case of "Tariq Bashir and 5 others v. The State" (PLD 1995 SC 34), their lordships in the august Supreme Court of Pakistan have been pleased to hold that grant of bail in such like cases is a rule and refusal an exception. I hardly find any exceptional circumstance to warrant refusal of bail to him.

6. However, it may be mentioned here that it has been argued by the learned counsel for the complainant that he is involved in two other cases. I am afraid that mere pendency or involvement in other cases of the type cannot be a clog in the way of extension of the relief to him. In this regard reference is made to the case of "Kashif Khan v. The State" (2009 PCr.LJ 1418).

7. In these circumstances of the case, I have been persuaded to hold that the case for his enlargement on bail has been made out.

8. I, therefore, accept this petition and admit him to bail subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.1,00,000 (Rupees one lac only) with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court..

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