MESSRS BOOZ ALLEN & HEMILTON INTERNATIONAL (PANAMA) INC., U. S. A. vs THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LAHORE
This matter arises from a set of petitions for leave to appeal directed against a common judgment of the Lahore High Court relating to tax references. The core legal question concerns the maintainability of petitions barred by a significant delay of 414 days without any application for condonation of delay or explanation for the limitation period. The Supreme Court held that the petitions were hopelessly time-barred and liable to dismissal, observing further that adding a prayer against a subsequent order refusing a certificate of fitness under the repealed constitutional provisions regarding appeals does not extend or save the limitation period for the main judgment. The key principle laid down is that petitions filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation without a proper application for condonation explaining each day of delay cannot be entertained, and attempting to link them with subsequent fruitless applications for fitness certificates does not cure the defect of time-bar.
- Are petitions for leave to appeal liable to dismissal when they are barred by a substantial period of limitation without any application or ground advanced for condonation of delay?
- Does the inclusion of a prayer against an order refusing a certificate of fitness extend the period of limitation for filing petitions against the main judgment?
- Section 66-A(2), Income-tax Act
ORDER
KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN, J.-This order will dispose of C. Ps. S. L. A. Nos. 175/77, 176/77, 177/77, 178/77, and 179/77, arising from a common judgment of the Lahore High Court in. The relevant Tax Reference mentioned therein.
2. The above-mentioned petitions have been filed against the order of the Lahore High Court dated 20-11-1975. Each petition is barred by 414 days. There is no application for condonation of delay nor any ground has been advanced otherwise in that respect either before us or in the petitions explaining each day of limitation. These petitions are consequently fable to be dismissed as time- barred. We hold and direct accordingly.
3. It may be mentioned that the petitioner had filed four miscellaneous applications (one in each Tax Reference) in the High Court praying for a certificate of fitness under section 66-A(2) of the Income-tax Act for appeal to this Court. These applications were rejected on 7-2-1977, on the ground that according to (1973) Constitution certificates of this kind prayed for could no longer be granted by a High Court. In this respect they relied upon Commissioner of Income-tax, Lahore v.
Umar Saigol (PLD 1.975 Lah. 1558), decided on 16-10-1975. The miscellaneous applications aforesaid were filed subsequently some where in February, 1976 after the aforesaid judgment of the High Court had received due publication in law reports. However, taking benefit of that order it has been prayed that "leave may graciously be granted to appeal to this Court against the order and judgment dated 7-2-1977 of Lahore High Court passed in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 4/Coin-S/76 read with its judgment and order dated 20-11-1975 passed in T. R. No. 1/74".
(This is the form of relief claimed in C. P. 175/77 and the reliefs claimed in the other petitions are of the same pattern and in each petition, reference of the relevant Tax Reference from which it arises has also been given). In this respect all we need observe is that since we have already dismissed the petitions against the main judgment, mere adding a prayer for leave to appeal against the order dated 7-2-1977 "read with judgment and order dated 20-11-1975", would neither extend the period of limitation for the main petitions and nor would it affect that judgment or order otherwise.
The main petitions in any case remain time-barred and their period of limitation could not be extended in the manner adopted herein.
4. The result is that these petitions have no merit and are dismissed.