REGISTRAR, LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE vs Malik RIAZ AHMAD KHOKHAR
This petition for leave to appeal challenged an order passed by the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, which had expunged adverse remarks from the respondent's Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs). The core legal question was whether the Service Tribunal erred in expunging these remarks, given the petitioner's argument that the Countersigning Officer's opinion should prevail over the Reporting Officer's opinion. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the adverse remarks were inextricably linked to charges in an inquiry from which the respondent had been exonerated. Consequently, the factual basis for the remarks no longer existed. The Court affirmed that it lacks jurisdiction to substitute its own findings of fact for those of the Service Tribunal when exercising powers under Article 212(3) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that a petitioner must raise a substantial question of law of public importance to invoke its jurisdiction under this provision. The judgment reinforces the principle that findings of fact by a Service Tribunal are generally final and not subject to re-evaluation by the Supreme Court absent a substantial legal question.
- Can the Supreme Court substitute its own findings of fact for those of a Service Tribunal under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973?
- Is a petition for leave to appeal maintainable if it fails to raise a substantial question of law of public importance?
- Should adverse remarks in an ACR be expunged if the underlying charges leading to those remarks were dismissed in an inquiry?
- Article 212(3), Constitution of Pakistan 1973
ORDER
' CH. IJAZ AHMED, J.--- Petitioner has filed this petition against the order dated 20-2-2009 passed by the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, Lahore High Court in Service Appeal No,6 of 2008 wherein the appeal filed by the respondent was accepted.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that learned High Court had erred in law to expunge adverse remarks in the ACRs of the respondent without adverting to the basic principle that the Countersigning Officers' opinion must be given due weight over the opinion of Reporting Officer.
The Countersigning Officer had passed adverse remarks against the respondent after perusing the record as is evident from the remarks dated 4-12-2007 which are available at page 21 of the paper book.
3. Learned counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned judgment.
4. We have given our anxious consideration to the contentions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. It is better and appropriate to reproduce para. 6 of the impugned order:-- "The remarks of the Countersigning Officer which were based on the charges whereupon the inquiry was conducted, and the appellant was exonerated from the charges. The adverse remarks no more hold the field and these remarks were expunged. The material on 'which the Countersigning Officer has based his opinion no more exist."
5. Mere reading the aforesaid paragraph clearly envisages that adverse remarks written against the respondent in his A.C.Rs, were set aside in inquiry. It is a settled law that parties are bound by their pleadings. The submissions made before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not taken out from the written statement filed by the petitioner before the High Court. Even otherwise, it is interesting to note reply of ground 'c' which is to the following effect:-- "The judgment dated 19-9-2008 is self-explanatory and needs no explanation on behalf of the respondent."
6. The said stand of petitioner is vague and is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The Service Tribunal had given findings of fact against the petitioner after perusing the record. It is settled law that this 'Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to substitute its own findings in place of findings of the Tribunal while exercising power under Article 212(3) of the Constitution as law laid down by this Court in Khan Muhammad Niazi's case 1990 SCM R 1416, Riaz-ul-Haq's case 1988 SCM R 1994. Even otherwise, learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to raise any substantial question of law of public importance as contemplated under Article 212(3) of the Constitution.
7. For what has been discussed above, this petition has no merit and the same is dismissed. .