AYUB ALI vs The STATE
The matter arises from a petition for special leave to appeal filed against the concurrent findings of the lower courts convicting the petitioner under Section 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the theft of a bicycle and sentencing him to two years rigorous imprisonment. The core legal questions involved the propriety of placing the onus of proof on the accused when found in possession of stolen property, and the sufficiency of the explanation for a delay in filing the petition. The Supreme Court held that the onus was rightly placed upon the petitioner under Section 114, illustration 'a' of the Evidence Act, and that the explanation offered for the delay was unsatisfactory and unsupported by evidence. The petition was accordingly dismissed both on merits and as being barred by limitation. The key principle laid down is that a person found in possession of recently stolen property must satisfactorily account for such possession under the Evidence Act, and insufficient or unverified explanations regarding delay in filing petitions will not condone limitation periods.
- Whether the onus to account for possession of a stolen bicycle is rightly placed upon the accused caught red-handed under the Evidence Act?
- Does an unverified claim of a transport strike and delayed letters constitute sufficient ground to condone delay in filing a petition for special leave?
- Whether a conviction under Section 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code is sustainable when the accused claims a mistaken belief of ownership regarding a stolen cycle?
- Section 379, Pakistan Penal Code
- Section 114, Evidence Act
ORDER
1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.-The petitioner was tried and convicted under section 379 of the Pakistan Penal Code for the theft of a bicycle and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years.
2. The prosecution case against him was that he was caught red-handed riding away on the bicycle of the complainant. He was chased for a distance by the complainant and two others on bicycles but they could not overtake him. Then they got into a jeep, followed him, caught hold of him along with the bicycle and took him to the police station.
3. His defence was that he had taken the bicycle under a genuine mistake believing it to be his own Raleigh cycle. The cycle which he was caught riding, however, was a BECO cycle.
4. Since he was caught red-handed in possession of the stolen cycle immediately after the theft, the onus was upon him to account for the possession of the cycle under section 114, illustration `a' of the Evidence Act. The trial Court was, therefore, right in placing this onus upon him.
5. His conviction has been upheld on appeal by the Additional Sessions Judge of Mymensingh and the High Court has refused to interfere in revision.
6. The petition for special leave is also barred by 15 days and the only explanation for the delay is that a letter written by the clerk of the petitioner's counsel on 10th March 1970, asking him to come to Dacca immediately with necessary funds for filing the petition for special leave did not reach him till the 16th March 1970. But even so, he could not collect the necessary funds till the 24th of March 1970, and then he was prevented from coming to Dacca by reason of the transport strike on the Dacca-Tangail route until the 31st March 1970. The petition was filed on the 2nd of April 1970.
7. We are not at all satisfied with this explanation, for, there is no evidence on the record to show that the letter was actually received by him on the 16th March 1970 or that there was any transport strike on this particular route from the 10th of March 1970 to the 30th of March 1970.
8. On merits also, there is no substance in this petition. The only point argued by the learned counsel, appearing in support of the petition is that the onus was wrongly placed upon him. As already pointed out, the onus to account for his possession was rightly placed upon him according to law.
9. He cannot make any grievance of that.
10. In the circumstances, the petition is dismissed both on merits as also on the ground that it is barred by limitation.