KHALID IJAZ vs STATE and another
The matter arises from a post-arrest bail application filed by the petitioner, Khalid Ijaz, seeking bail on the statutory ground of delay following the non-compliance of a previous court direction to conclude the trial within three months, and on the subsequent development of a private complaint being instituted against him. The core legal question is whether the mere non-compliance of a trial-conclusion deadline set by the court creates a right to bail, and whether summoning in a parallel private complaint warrants post-arrest bail in the primary State case. The Lahore High Court held that the failure to conclude the trial within the stipulated timeframe does not, by itself, confer a right to bail upon the accused, and dismissed the application. The key principle laid down is that delay in concluding a trial beyond a previously ordered timeframe does not automatically entitle an accused to post-arrest bail if merits have already been considered against him.
- Does the non-compliance of a court direction to conclude a trial within a specified period create a favourable right for the accused to be released on bail?
- Whether an accused is entitled to post-arrest bail in a State case upon being summoned in a parallel private complaint?
- Does a delay in concluding the trial by itself provide sufficient ground for the grant of bail after earlier merits have been adjudicated against the accused?
- Section 91, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
ORDER
Khalid Ijaz after having been declined earlier relief of grant of bail by this Court vide order dated 27.10.2011 has come again for the same relief on the ground that earlier direction was issued by this Court to conclude the trial within three months but the same has not yet been concluded; non- compliance of direction has created a favourable right in favour of the petitioner for his release on bail and again another development has been made that the complainant party has instituted a private complaint wherein the petitioner and his co-accused have been summoned to meet this situation while adopting the procedure laid down in Noor Elahi's case private criminal complaint shall proceed first. In these circumstances, the petitioner is entitled for the grant of bail.
2. Learned D.P.G assisted by learned counsel for the complainant Mr. Rehan Faheem Mahil has opposed the application on the ground that already the Court has discussed merits in detail and non-compliance of direction issued by this Court does not create any right in favour of the petitioner to be admitted on bail. Learned counsel for the complainant Mr. Rehan Faheem Mahil by goo but venerably has submitted that so far as summoning in the complaint case is concerned, no order has been passed by the learned trial Court for the submission of bonds under Section 91 Cr.P.C. by the petitioner or his co-accused and even in case of trial of private complaint the petitioner is not entitled for the grant of bail in the State case relying upon M. Hidayatullah and another Vs. Bhargava and another (AIR 1971 S.0 2486) wherein it has been observed as follows: "(B) Criminal P.C. (1898), Sec. 91--Power to take bond for appearance--Provision applies to a person who is present in Court and is free because it speaks of his being bound over, to appear on another day before the Court."
Learned counsel for the complainant seems to be tenderfoot in the profession but has been found inquisitive to be enriched by exploring legal knowledge.
3. Heard. Record perused.
4. So far as earlier order passed by this Court is concerned, all the grounds taken in this bail application by the petitioners have already been discussed and adjudicated upon except summoning in the private complaint case. So far as non-compliance of the order to conclude the trial within three months is concerned, it does not by itself provide a right to the petitioner to be granted bail. The Court has been convinced by the legal precedents referred to and relied upon by the learned counsel for the complainant. Hence, no case for grant of bail is made out in favour of the petitioner, therefore, the instant application is dismissed.