Maqbool Ahmad And Another vs The State
This is a second application under Section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking suspension of sentence and release on bail of the petitioners who were convicted and sentenced under Sections 302, 324, 337-F(i), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question is whether the statutory period of two years for suspension of sentence under the amendment to Section 426(1-A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 counts from the date of the appellant's arrest by virtue of Section 382-B, or from the date of conviction. The Lahore High Court held that the statutory period of two years commences from the date of conviction and does not include the pre-conviction period of detention. The key principle laid down is that the benefit of the pre-conviction period under Section 382-B cannot be extended to calculate the two-year statutory delay period for suspension of sentence under Section 426(1-A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.
- Does the two-year statutory period for suspension of sentence under Section 426(1-A)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 start from the date of arrest or the date of conviction?
- Can the benefit of the pre-conviction detention period under Section 382-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be used to calculate the statutory period for bail under Section 426?
- Whether a convicted person sentenced to imprisonment exceeding seven years is entitled to bail if their appeal has not been decided within two years of conviction?
- Section 426, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 324, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 337-F(i), Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 148, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 382-B, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 426(1-A)(c), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
ORDER
IJAZ AHMAD CHAUDHRY, CJ. - This is a second application under Section 426, Cr.P.C, seeking suspension of sentence awarded to the petitioners/convicts by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gojra, vide judgment dated 21.07.2010, in case F.I.R. No. 144, registered at Police Station Nawan Lahore, Gojra, for offences under Sections 302, 324, 337-F(i), 148 & 149, P.P.C., whereby they were convicted and sentenced as under:-
(i) Under Section 324/34. P.P.C.
10 years' R.I. And fine of Rs. 20,000/- in default of payment whereof further R.I. For 2 years.
(ii) Under Section 337-F/(in P.P.C.
One year's R.I. With payment of Daman Rs. 10,000/-.
(iii) Under Section 324/34. P.P.C.
Two years' R.I. And payment of Daman Rs. 10,000/-.
2. In support of this petition, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners have been given benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C, by the learned Trial Court, hence, their conviction would start w.e.f. 13.09.2009 i.e. From the date of their arrest and thus, they are entitled to be released on bail, on account of recent amendment in Section 426, Cr.P.C.
3. On the other hand, learned Additional Prosecutor General as well as learned counsel for the complainant have vehemently opposed this petition by submitting that judgment in the instant case was delivered on 21.07.2010, therefore, statutory ground has not yet accrued to the petitioners, hence, the instant petition being misconceived is liable to be dismissed.
4. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the impugned judgment, I have noted that through the impugned judgment the petitioners/convicts were awarded imprisonment for ten years alongwith other sentences in various offences detail of which has been given above and according to the amendment brought in Section 426(1-A)(c), Cr.P.C., an Appellate Court shell, except where it is of the opinion that'* the delay in the decision of appeal has been occasioned by an at or omission of the appellant or any other person acting on his behalf, order a convicted person to be released on bail who has been sentenced to imprisonment for life or imprisonment exceeding seven years and whose appeal has not been decided within a period of two years of his conviction. The petitioners have preferred their appeal before this Court on 14.09.2010, so the period required for releasing them on bail has not elapsed so far. The submission of the learned counsel that the statutory period of two years would start from the arrest of the appellant is not tenable as the benefit of period before conviction is not mentioned in the amendment. Resultantly this application being misconceived is hereby dismissed.