SADIA JABBAR and 3 others vs FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN through Secretary, Revenue Division, Islamabad and others
This matter arises from petitions for leave to appeal directed against a judgment of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi. The core legal question involved the interpretation and application of provisions relating to the determination of import values under the Customs Act, specifically concerning sections 18, 25, and 25A. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had remanded the case back to the Director Evaluation for a fresh determination of the value of goods in accordance with the law, noting that no adverse final decision had been passed against the petitioners and that their apprehensions were conjectural. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitions were barred by time by four days without any plausible explanation offered for the delay. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that no case was made out for the grant of leave to appeal. The petitions were accordingly dismissed on merits as well as on the ground of limitation, affirming the remand for fresh determination.
- Whether resort to section 25A of the Customs Act 1969 is uncalled for when section 25 exhaustively prescribes modes for determination of value?
- Can a petition be maintained against a judgment that merely remands a matter to the departmental authority for a fresh determination of value?
- Does an apprehension regarding a potential future departmental determination constitute a valid ground for grant of leave to appeal?
- Section 18, Customs Act 1969
- Section 25, Customs Act 1969
- Section 25A, Customs Act 1969
EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, J.---By this single judgment we 'propose to decide CPLA Nos. 813 to 816 of 2011 which have arisen out of the judgment dated 28-2-2011 of the High Court of Sindh Karachi.
2. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that when section 25 of the Customs Act exhaustively prescribes the modes for determination of value, resort to section 25A of Act without there being any convincing reason, would be uncalled for. Learned counsel next contended that when section 18 of the Act deals with the determination of the value of the goods imported, it cannot be overstretched to include the goods to be imported, therefore, the impugned judgment overstepping the limits prescribed by the statute cannot be maintained.
3. Leaned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents by referring to para 27 of the impugned judgment contended that when the case has been sent back to Director Evaluation for determination of value of the goods afresh the petitioners do not have any cause of grievance.
Even the apprehension of the petitioners, the learned counsel added, which is conjectural on the face of it, cannot form basis for grant of leave to appeal.
4. We have gone through the relevant record. Before we discuss the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners it is worthwhile to refer to para 27 of the impugned judgment which reads as under:-- "The next ruling is No.Misc/38/2009-VI-A dated 28-10-2009, issued in relation to automotive safety glass. The ruling refers to some of the methods of section 25 (referring to subsections (1), (5), (6) and (7) and then purports to apply the computed value method (subsection (8)). However, it is not evident how the computed value method has been applied. It is clear from Rule 120 that in order to properly apply this method, information must be obtained from the producer of the imported goods. It seems that no such exercise was carried out, and the method was applied essentially on the basis of information supplied by local manufacturers. Furthermore, the customs value determined is applied to China and the "Far East". As noted .Above, the Valuation Agreement and section 25 operate in the context of a country of export and a country of import (which of course, is Pakistan), and the "Far East" is not a country. This ruling therefore, is also ultra vires section 25A."
A look at the above quoted paragraph shows that no decision much less adverse has been passed against the petitioners. Yes the case has been sent back to the department for determination of value afresh, but we don't think that that would in any way go to the detriment of the petitioners.
There is absolutely nothing in the above quoted paragraph as could show that any of the provisions of the Customs Act in general or section 18 'of. The Act in particular has been overstretched against its letter and spirit. The apprehension of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this background appears to be conjectural on the face of it. Quite apart from this when the' petitions are barred by 4 days and no plausible explanation has been offered therefor, we do not feel persuaded to grant leave to appeal. For the reasons discussed above all the petitions are dismissed. .