Abdul Rauf Chaudhry And 2 Others vs The State And 2 Others
This Intra-Court Appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge in Chamber, whereby a writ petition seeking the quashment of F.I.R. No. 61 dated 10.02.2012 registered under Sections 408, 419, 410, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code was dismissed. The core legal question raised was whether the provisions of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 create an implied bar or prohibition against the registration of a criminal first information report by the police prior to or instead of approaching the specialized authorities or tribunals. The Islamabad High Court held that the registration of an F.I.R. and the taking of cognizance of an offense by a court are two distinct and independent concepts under criminal law, and in the absence of any specific statutory clog or prohibition on the registration of an F.I.R., the police are not barred from registering one. The appeal was accordingly dismissed in limine.
- Are the registration of an F.I.R. and the taking of cognizance of an offense distinct and independent concepts under criminal law?
- Does the Companies Ordinance, 1984 place an implied prohibition on the registration of a criminal F.I.R. by the police?
- Can a criminal F.I.R. be quashed merely because a specialized statutory authority or court is empowered to take cognizance of the matter under a special law?
- Section 408, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 410, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 419, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 468, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 471, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 263, Companies Ordinance 1984
- Section 264, Companies Ordinance 1984
- Section 265, Companies Ordinance 1984
- Section 7(4), Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001
NOOR-UL-HAQ N. QURESHI, J. - The instant Intra-Court Appeal is directed against order dated 21.12.2012 passed by learned Single Judge in Chamber by virtue of which writ petition filed by the appellants was dismissed.
2. The facts giving rise to the present I.C.A., are that respondent No. 3 lodged F.I.R. No. 61, dated 10.02.2012 under Sections 408,419, 410,468 and 471, P.P.C., Police Station Sabzi Mandi, Islamabad against petitioner No. 1. Petitioner filed writ petition for quashment of the said F.I.R. But the writ was declined by learned Single Judge in Chamber.
3. Mainly it is contended that in view of Sections 263 to 265 of Companies Ordinance, 1984, Registrar of the Companies having authority to take cognizance of the matter. Coupled with such plea, it is also contended that Section 7(4) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, prescribed that only the Banking Court could take cognizance of offence under the Ordinance on a complaint in writing made by a person authorized by the Bank on that behalf. The respondents had to approach the competent authority under the Companies Ordinance, as such, lodging of F.I.R. Is without jurisdiction.
4. Arguments heard. Record perused.
5. At the very outset, on a query raised by the Court, the learned counsel for the appellant failed to satisfy with regard to availability of any mode prescribed with respect to the taking of cognizance of an offence or implied prohibition regarding registration of F.I.R. Needless to say that the registration of F.I.R. And taking of cognizance of cases are two distinct and independent concepts under the criminal law. No clog on the registration of the F.I.R. Has been provided specifically. Our view is. Supported by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding Civil Pettion No, 356-L of 2005.
6. The appellants have not been able to substantiate any ground before us, on account of which interference is required in the impugned order. We find no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order, which does not call for any interference in this Intra-Court Appeal. In view of the same, this appeal being devoid of merits, is dismissed in limine with all enlisted applications.