CHAIRMAN, EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY, WEST PAKISTAN, LAHORE vs MUHAMMAD DIN AND ANOTHER

ORDER

SARDAR MUHAMMAD IQBAL, J.--A reference under subsection (3) of section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, was made by the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Board, West Pakistan, through the Chairman, District Evacuee Trust Committee, Jhelum, to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, seeking a declaration that the property in dispute was attached to a religius trust. The case was heard by Mr. M. A, A. Wasty, Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Rawalpindi, with the delegated powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner and he by his order dated the 16th of December 1969, held that the property in dispute was not an evacuee trust property. This is an appeal under subsection (4) of section 4 of the Act aforesaid.

2. An appeal under subsection (4) of section 4 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, lies to the High Court if it is presented within thirty days of the order. In the instant case the order was passed on the 16th of December 1969. The application for obtaining copy was made on the 2nd of January 1970 and the copy was delivered on the 8th of January 1970.

The appellant became entitled to the exclusion of six days which were spent in getting the copy of the impugned order. The appeal should have been filed by or before the 22nd of January 1970, but the same has been preferred on the 9th of March 1970. The appeal is barred by more than a month and a half.

3. Learned counsel relies on subsection (3) of section 19 of the Act to contend that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act apply in computing the period of Chairman, limitation and that the delay for the remaining one month and a half be condoned on the ground that the Clerk of the Department who was handling the case acted negligently which resulted in v. the delay in filing, the appeal. Subsection (3) of section 19 lays down : "The provisions of sections 5 and 12 of the -- period of fifteen days," Section 19 deals with appeals against Limitation Act, 1908, shall apply in computing the aforesaid the orders of the Assistant Settlement Commissioners ; Deputy Settlement Commissioners, and Additional Settlement Commissioners, to their respective appellate authorities. Subsection (2) of the said section provides that an "appeal shall be presented within fifteen days of the date of the order appealed against". Section 5 has, in our opinion been made applicable only to appeals which an aggrieved person may have the right to file under section 19, If a question arises whether or not an evacuee property is attached to a charitable, religious or educational trust or institution, the matter, under subsection (3) of section 4 of the Act, has to be referred to the Chief Settlement Commissioner whose decision thereon, it is provided in subsection (3) ibid, "shall be final and shall not, except as provided in subsection (4), be called in question in any Court". Subsection (4) lays down : "Any person aggrieved by an order under subsection (3), may within thirty days of the order, prefer an appeal to the High Court."

Subsections (3) and (4) were added to section 4 by the Displaced Persons Law A Amendment Ordinance XIII of 1964. The provision of appeal in subsection (4) of section 4 is quite independent of section 1 whereunder the period of limitation is 15 days as against 30 days under the former. If the Legislature had provided in the main Act that section 5 would be applicable to all proceedings under the Act, then even if subsections (3) and (4) were added subsequently, the appeal under section 4 (4) from the order o the Chief Settlement Commissioner to the High Court would have been governed by the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act. This, however, is not the case here. Sections 5 and 12 have specifically been made applicable to the appeals competent under section 19 alone. The intention of the Legislature to exclude the application of the Limitation Act with regard to the appeals under subsection (4) of section 4 is clear inasmuch as if they had intended that it should apply, there was no limitation on their power to make a provision similar to that of subsection (3) of section 19. No maxim of law is of more general and uniform application than expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or which is shortly put expressio unius alterius exclusio-- a maxim meaning "express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another". It is B never more applicable than in the construction and interpretation of statutes (Broom Leg. Max.) Whenever a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular form, it necessarily includes in itself a negative, viz., that the thing shall not be done otherwise. The expression of a condition excludes the doing of the act authorised, under other circumstances than those so defined. It is, indeed, a principle of logic and of common sense, and not merely a technical rule of construction. We are therefore, clear in our mind that the provisions of section 5' of the Limitation Act do not reach subsection (4) of section 4 of the Act.

4. The appeal being barred by limitation, we would dismiss it in limine.

5. A copy of this order shall be sent to the Law Department of the Government, and also to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, for consideration whether they would like to extend the application of sections 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act to the appeals under section 4 (4) of the 1958-Act.