Rai HAFEEZULLAH TARIQ vs DEPUTY MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR, SARGODHA AND Another

ORDER

1. ANWARUL. HAQ, C. J.---This order will dispose of civil petition for leave to appeal bearing No. &99 of 1979, which is directed" against an interim order made by a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court on the 24th of October, 1979, in a petition moved by the petitioner under Article 199 of the Constitution to call in question his apprehended arrest under an order of preventive detention said to have been issued by the Martial Law authorities under Martial Law Order 12.

2. When the petition carne up for preliminary hearing before the learned Judge on the 24th of October, 1979, he passed the following order "Contends that after his release on 15-10-1979, the petitioner was ordered to be detained by the D. M. L. A., Sargodha on 16-10-1979 under C. M. L. O. 12. y It is contended that there is no material on the basis of which the petitioner could be ordered to be detained.

3. Notice to respondent No. 1 to produce the record within 7 days. .In the meanwhile the petitioner is directed to surrender to the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of the Court, who will inform the Martial La Headquarters, Lahore of his having done so. To be heard on 30-10-1979."

4. It is stated that when the matter came up before the learned Judge on the 30th of October, 1979, he was informed that the petitioner had not surrendered to the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court in terms of the preliminary order dated the 24th of October, 1979. In the circum--stances, the learned Judge adjourned the further hearing of the petition to the 6th of November, 1979, saying that the petition remained pending until his order of the 24th of October, 1979, is complied with. We are informed that when the matter came up again on the 6th of .November, 1979, it was adjourned to the 11th of November, 1979, for the same reason.

5. The main grievance of Mr. Bashir Zafar, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, is that the order of the 24th of October, 1979, made by the High Court, in fact, amounts to a direction to the Martial Law authorities B to come and take the petitioner into custody from the premises of the High Court. The learned Advocate-General appearing for the respondents, submits that this is not necessarily so as the order of the High Court in terms only states that the Martial Law Headquarters will be informed that the petitioner has surrendered to the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court.

6. We feel that the order as interpreted by the learned Advocate-General is not open to any exception. In the circumstances, no justification is made out for our interference in the matter The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.