RAZAK DAD: vs PROVINCE OF THE PUNJAB
The petitioner, initially appointed as a Machine-Man and later serving as a temporary Sub-Inspector, had his services terminated by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Rawalpindi. He challenged the termination through a civil suit which was initially decreed in his favor, but upon abatement, the matter went to the Punjab Services Tribunal, which set aside the civil court's decree. The petitioner sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, arguing that the Inspector-General of Police was his appointing authority and that his termination by the Senior Superintendent of Police was without lawful authority. The core legal question was whether the Inspector-General of Police was indeed the appointing authority and whether the termination was legally competent. The Supreme Court held that the Inspector-General was not the appointing authority, as the relied-upon document was merely a directive to the Deputy Inspector-General to make the appointment, and that the Superintendent of Police was competent to terminate the service. The petition was dismissed.
- Whether the Inspector-General of Police is the appointing authority for a temporary Sub-Inspector when the initial communication is merely a directive to the Deputy Inspector-General to make the appointment?
- Does rule 12.8 of the Police Rules apply to persons not appointed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the preceding rules?
- Whether the Superintendent of Police is competent to terminate the services of a temporary Sub-Inspector?
- Rule 12.8, Police Rules
- Rule 12.7, Police Rules
- Rule 2(3)(d), West Pakistan (Temporary Employees) Rules 1968
- Section 179, Constitution of Pakistan 1973
ORDER
MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN, J. The petitioner was appointed Machine-Man (Offset Press-man) on the Printing Press installed at the Police Training College, Sahala, and is said to have been appointed as a temporary A. S. I. And later on promoted to officiate as a temporary Sub-Inspector. He was to be adjusted against the strength of the Rawalpindi District for the purposes of pay etc. His services were terminated by the order of the Senior Super--intendent of Police, Rawalpindi dated 24-4-1979 on fourteen days' notice. He challenged the order before the Civil Judge, Rawalpindi who decreed the suit on 30-7-1973 ashe came to the conclusion that the S. S. P. Was, not competent to terminate the service of the. Petitioner. The defendant fled an appeal which was pending before the District Judge when it abated on the coming into force, of the Constitution of 1973 and the appointment of the Punjab Services Tribunal. The Punjab Services Tribunal vide its order dated 12-9-1979 has set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge. Hence this petition for special leave to appeal.
2. Learned counsel has submitted before us that the petitioner was appointed by the Inspector- General of Police and his service could, therefore, not be terminated by any authority subordinate to him. The order of the Senior Superintendent of Police, according to him, is, therefore, without any lawful authority. On being asked to show the document he was relying upon he referred us to page 23 of the paper book on which there is a copy of the letter issued by the Inspector-General of Police, West Pakistan, Lahore, to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Rawalpindi Range, Rawalpindi. By this letter the Inspector-General has only directed that "he may be appointed as a temporary A. S. I. . . . ". This, therefore, is not the appointment letter. It is only a letter from the Inspector-General of Police to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police asking for the appointment of the petitioner as a temporary A. S. I. In other words, the Inspector-General did not himself appoint him but left it to the D. I.-G. To make his appointment. It is, therefore, not correct to say that the I: G. Is the appointing authority. It is not denied that normally the Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority of the A. S. Is. And is, therefore, entitled to terminate their services.
3. Learned counsel tried to rely upon rule 12.8 of the Police Rules in support of his submission that the Inspector-General of Police is the appoint--ing authority. His argument, however, ignores the fact that rule 12.8 applies to persons who have been appointed under rule 12.7 only and it is not denied that the petitioner was not appointed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Rules preceding rule 12.8.
4. Learned counsel submitted that the Tribunal fell in error in applying the West Pakistan (Temporary Employees) Rules, 1968 framed under section 179 of the 1973 Constitution. His reason for so submitting was that the definition of the temporary employee given in rule 2(3)(d) does not include a person who has been appointed for an indefinite period. We asked the learned counsel to demonstrate to us that the petitioner was employed for an indefinite period. He has not been able to do so and relies only upon the copy of the document at page 23 of the; paper book which we have already referred to above and which is not the appointment order. In any case it does not say that he has been appointed for an indefinite period.
5. This petition has no merit and is, therefore, dismissed.