COLONY THAL TEXTILE MILLS LTD. vs THE SUPERINTENDENT OF CENTRAL EXCISE
This matter comes before the Supreme Court of Pakistan upon a petition for leave to appeal arising from a dispute regarding the deduction of duty on exported cotton fabrics from monthly capacity duty installments. The core legal question is whether a petitioner can invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court without first exhausting statutory remedies of appeal and revision provided under the relevant tax statute. The Court held that the petitioner was precluded from approaching the High Court in writ jurisdiction because he failed to avail of the statutory remedies of appeal to the Central Board of Revenue and revision to the Central Government. The key principle laid down is that extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot be utilized to bypass statutory remedies and hierarchical forums established by law for the redressal of grievances.
- Whether a petitioner can approach the High Court in writ jurisdiction without exhausting statutory remedies of appeal and revision?
- Does failure to file an appeal under section 35 of the Central Excises Act 1944 preclude a party from invoking writ jurisdiction?
- Is a petitioner entitled to deduct duty on cotton fabrics exported from monthly capacity duty installments without first seeking redress before the Central Board of Revenue?
- Rule 12, Central Excises Rules 1944
- Rule 8(3), Capacity Rules
- Section 35, Central Excises Act 1944
- Section 36, Central Excises Act 1944
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI, J.-Mr. Zaheer Ahmad Khan, appearing in support of the petition for leave to appeal, states that the High Court has since passed an order in another similar case granting the relief which the petitioner claims in this case, namely, that the petitioner is entitled to deduct duty on cotton fabrics exported by him from the monthly instalment of capacity duty payable under rule 12 of the Central Excises Rules, 1944, read with rule 8(3) of the Capacity Rules. The learned counsel, therefore, hopes that the same relief may be granted to the petitioner by the Central Board of Revenue.
2. We also find that the petitioner had not filed an appeal to the Central Board of Revenue from the order of the Superintendent of Central Excise and Land Customs, Sargodha, as provided in section 35 of the Central Excises Act, 1944. He had a further right to move a revision petition before the Central Government under section 36, but neither remedy was availed of by him. In view of this omission, the petitioner was, in our opinion, precluded from approaching the High Court in writ jurisdiction which was tantamount to bye-passing the jurisdiction conferred by law on the Central Board of Revenue and the Central Government.
3. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed with the observations that the petitioner should in the first instance seek his remedy, if any, before the Central Board of Revenue.