MUHAMMAD HUZAFA vs AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (PAKISTAN)
The petitioner Muhammad Huzafa filed a writ petition against the judgment and order of the Insurance Tribunal, Peshawar, which stayed proceedings in the petitioner's claim pending the sanction of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) pursuant to section 162 of the Insurance Ordinance. The core legal question was whether section 162 of the Insurance Ordinance requires prior sanction of the Commission before a claimant can institute proceedings against an insurer. The Peshawar High Court held that the provisions of section 162 are clear and unambiguous, prohibiting the institution of any proceedings against an insurer without the prior sanction of the Commission, except where proceedings are instituted by the Commission itself. The court established the principle that obtaining previous sanction from the Commission is a mandatory prerequisite for initiating proceedings against an insurer under the Insurance Ordinance, and consequently dismissed the writ petition as devoid of substance, upholding the impugned order of the Insurance Tribunal.
- Whether prior sanction of the Commission is required under section 162 of the Insurance Ordinance before instituting proceedings against an insurer?
- Does section 162 of the Insurance Ordinance apply to claimants seeking to initiate proceedings before the Insurance Tribunal?
- Can the High Court interfere in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction with an order staying proceedings for want of statutory sanction?
- Section 162, Insurance Ordinance 2000
' MIFTAH-UD-DIN KHAN, J.---Petitioner Muhammad Huzafa has filed the present writ petition against the judgment and order dated 21-5-2011 of the learned Insurance Tribunal, Peshawar, whereby, the proceedings in the petition of petitioner was stayed till sanction of SECP in terms of section 162 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2000.
2. Learned counsel for petitioner contended that the aforesaid provision is not applicable to the claimants but even then the learned Insurance Tribunal stayed the proceedings which order of learned Insurance Tribunal is wrong, illegal and without lawful authority.
3. Learned counsel for respondent defended the order of learned Insurance Tribunal and contended that the provisions of section 162 of the Insurance Ordinance are clear and unambiguous, hence, the learned Insurance Tribunal has rightly stayed the proceedings in the matter.
4. The contention of learned counsel for petitioner has got no force because the provisions of section 162 of the Insurance Ordinance are very much clear and unambiguous and no proceedings can be conducted without the sanction of the Commission. The provision of section 162 is reproduced as under:-- "Except where proceedings are instituted by the Commission no proceedings under this Ordinance against an Insurer or any Director, Manager or other Officer of an insurer shall be instituted by any person unless he has previous thereto obtained the sanction of the Commission (which shall not unreasonably be withheld) to the institution of such proceedings".
5. So, it is obvious from the above mentioned provision of section 162 of the Insurance Ordinance, 2002 that no proceedings shall be lodged by any person without previous sanction of the Commission (i.e, SECP). Thus, we hold that the impugned order of learned Insurance Tribunal is perfectly in accordance with law and legal provision, hence, warrants no interference by this Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction.
6. The present writ petition is without any substance, hence, dismissed.