SULTAN MUHAMMAD AND 3 Others vs Malik MUHAMMAD ASLAM AND 2 Other
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a Lahore High Court judgment dismissing a writ petition challenging an order passed by the Custodian, Evacuee Property. The petitioners, who were occupants of property treated as evacuee property, sought to challenge a redemption order granted in favor of the respondent, which had effectively removed the property from the compensation pool. The petitioners had previously utilized this same redemption order in 1969 to successfully challenge their ejectment proceedings, arguing that the property was no longer evacuee property. Years later, they sought to challenge the legality of that same redemption order. The Supreme Court declined to examine the competency of the appeal against the delegatee of the Custodian. Instead, the Court held that the petitioners were barred from relief due to their own conduct. Having relied upon and benefited from the redemption order to protect their possession in 1969, they could not subsequently invoke the discretionary writ jurisdiction of the High Court to challenge the same order as illegal. The petition was dismissed on this ground of conduct alone.
- Can a party who has relied upon and benefited from an administrative order subsequently challenge that same order in writ jurisdiction?
- Does the conduct of a petitioner in prior proceedings affect the exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction by the High Court?
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.-This petition for leave to appeal calls in question judgment dated 3- 5-1980 of the Lahore High Court, whereby a writ petition against an order of Custodian, Evacuee Property, was dismissed.
2. The facts relevant for disposal of this petition, as narrated by the learned counsel for the petitioners, are that the petitioners are occupants of disputed property which was being treated on evacuee property and for which they were paying rent to the Rehabilitation and Settlement Department. Because of being locals they could not claim it for transfer. Respondent No. 1, posing himself to be the' owner of this property, preferred a claim for redemption as, according to him, it was 'under mortgage with evacuee. The case was sent to the Additional Settlement Commissioner as delegatee of the Custodian, who allowed the redemption on 7-5-1969. The petitioners were not parties to these proceedings. On 22-R-1969, the petitioners were ordered to be ejected by the D. S. C. For the benefit of respondent No. 1. The petitioners filed an appeal against this order of ejectment and took the plea that the D. S. C. Had no jurisdiction because the property had, on account of order of redemption, gone out of compensation pool. It was allowed in the same year (1969).
3. Learned counsel showed his inability to give the exact date. Respondent No. 1 challenged the appellate order in a revision, which was dismissed by a Settlement Commissioner on 22-2-1972.
4. The petitioners then filed an appeal against the order of redemption dated 7-5-1969, before the Custodian, Evacuee property, who dismissed it on the ground that an appeal against and, order of his delegated was not competent. The petitioners also filed a writ petition, which having been dismissed, they have now sought leave to appeal.
5. Learned counsel has tried to show that notwithstanding the fact that the order impugned before the learned Custodian was of his delegatee, an appeal was competent. It is not necessary for us to examine this question as the writ petition (as also this petition) was liable to be dismissed on account of the conduct of the petitioners. They having relied upon and made use of the order of redemption for protecting their possession in 1969, could not be allowed any relief in discretionary writ jurisdiction of the High Court after several years, on the basis that, as contended by them, the same order of redemption was illegal and without lawful authority. We, accordingly, dismiss this petition on this ground alone.