YOUSAF AND 2 Others vs Tile STATE
The petitioners, convicted by a Magistrate for offenses under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, sought special leave to appeal against an order of the Lahore High Court that declined to suspend their sentences pending the disposal of their appeal. The core legal question was whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court's discretionary refusal to suspend sentences while the appeal remained pending. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had properly exercised its discretion in refusing to suspend the sentences, noting that it would not delve into the merits of the evidence while the appeal was still pending before the High Court. Furthermore, the Court observed that the statutory provision regarding mandatory bail for sentences not exceeding three years, where the appeal has not been decided within six months, was not yet applicable in the instant case given the timeline of the conviction. Consequently, the petition for special leave was dismissed, affirming that the appellate court's discretion in suspending sentences should not be lightly interfered with by the Supreme Court at an interlocutory stage.
- Does the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's discretionary refusal to suspend a sentence pending appeal?
- Under what circumstances does Section 426(1-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 mandate the release of a convicted person on bail?
- Should the Supreme Court evaluate the merits of evidence in a trial while an appeal is still pending in the High Court?
- Section 307, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 326, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 148, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 426(1-A), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD AKRAM, J.-According to the prosecution while Ahmad Din and. Aziz co-accused had gauged out the eye-balls of Muhammad Aslam P. W. With their respective knives, petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 herein had inflicted injuries with their lathis on him and Khan alias Khanu petitioner No. 3 was instrumental in preventing the eye-witnesses from coming to for his rescue. The petitioners along with the two co-accused were sent up for trial under section 307/326/148/149, P. P. C. Before Chaudbry Muhammad Akram, Magistrate First Class with Section 30 powers, Okara. Eventually he convicted all the five accused and taking a comparatively lenient 'view sentenced the three petitioners herein to suffer two years' R. I. Under section 326/ 149, P. P. C. And one year's R. 1 under section 148, P. P. C. And fine. The five convicts then filed a joint appeal against their convictions and sentences. A learned Judge of the Lahore High Court while admitted the appeal to a regular hearing declined to suspend the sentences awarded to them. This order was passed by a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court at Lahore on the 4th March, 1979.
2. In these circumstances the three petitioners herein have filed this petition for special leave from the order dated 4th of March, 1979 refusing to 1 suspend the sentences awarded to them pending the disposal of their appeal by the High Court. We have beard the learned counsel at some length in this petition. We find that both in the High Court as well as before us in his arguments the learned counsel has attempted to take us to the merits bf the evidence recorded against the accused at the trial.However, we have advisably refrained from making any observation on the merits of the appeal which at present is pending in the High Court. Suffice to mention here that the learned Single Judge has applied his mind to these contentions and was not persuaded in suspending the sentences awarded to the petitioners by the learned trial Magistrate at this stage. In doing so he has exercised the discretion vested in him under the law. Moreover, section 426(1-A) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 lays down that an appellate Court shall, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, it otherwise directs, order a convicted person to be released on bail who has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years and whose appeal has not been decided within a period of six months of his conviction. In the instant case the learned trialagistrate had recorded the conviction against the petitioners herein on the 20th of December 1978. This is yet another reason for us in refusing to interfere in the case a this stage.
3. This petition has no force and is therefore, dismissed.